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How Did We Get Here? Dissecting the Hedge Fund
Conundrum Through an Institutional Theory Lens
By Cary Martin Shelby*
This article dissects both the origins and resulting harms of what the author terms the
"hedge fund conundrum," in which institutional investors, such as pension plans and en-
dowments, have consistently increased hedge fund allocations over the past decade despite
pervasive evidence of excessive fees and subpar returns. It then utilizes an historical insti-
tutionalist lens to examine how lawmakers may have enabled a conundrum of this mag-
nitude. By and large, this phenomenon is a symptom of regulatory loopholes that have per-
mitted the private hedge fund market to increase in "publicness" through its expanding
acccss and subsequent harm to retail investors. Such investors are now indirectly exposed
to hedge funds through pension plans and endowments, without receiving the investor pro-
tection guarantees under the federal securities laws. Subsets of historical institutionalism,
such as "conversion" and "drift," provide useful rubrics in analyzing how the law has
evolved in this regard. In terms of conversion, lawmakers initially coniverted concepts of
publicness through administrative regulations and court rulings that expanded indirect re-
tail investor acccss to private investments. With respect to drift, lawmakers then failed to
update these amended definitions to accommodate volving notions of publicness brought
about by financial innovation and changing market conditions.
An examination of this nature is novel in this area of the law and it provides a useful
guidepost for exploring well-tailored solutions that concede the unlikelihood of subjecting
hedge funds to direct regulation. Such a solution would therefore rely on conversion to ef-
fectively create a regulated market for "hedge-fund-like" strategies. This would entail loos-
ening (but not eliminating) the section 18 capital restrictions that currently apply to mutual
funds. Loosening these restrictions would allow pension plans and other institutional inves-
tors to acccss essential opportunities for wealth maximization, particularly during declining
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markets, in a transparent market that is subject to extensive regulation. If, however,
pension plans and other institutional investors continue to allocate to hedge funds in an
inefficent manncr, Congress should then consider more drastic measures, such as
cornpletely excluding such investors from accessing private investment funds by amending
elite investor definitions provided under federal securities laws.
Contents
Introduction ............................................. . 736
I. Growing Prevalence of Hedge Funds .................... 742
A. Overview of Investment Fund Regulation ........ 742
B. Hedge Funds Deconstructed ............................... 745
C. Exorbitant Growth and Emerging Controversies...... ......... 749
II. Dissecting the Hedge Fund Conundrum ...................... 752
A. Inability to Beat the Markets ............................... 752
B. Hidden Fees and Limited Impact of Contractual Protections ...... 757
C. Resulting Harms.......................................... 759
D. Irrational Allocations Enabled by Hedge Fund Opacity............... 763
III. How Did We Get Here? An Institutional Theory Lens ...... ........ 768
A. Historical Institutionalism, Conversion, and Drift...... ........ 768
B. Stage 1: Conversion of Publicness Through Adoption of
Regulation D .................. ................. 771
C. Stage 2: Further Conversion of Publicness Through Passage of the
National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 .............. 774
D. Stage 3: Lawmakers Fail to Update Amended Definitions of
Publicness Resulting in Drift............ 776
IV. Conversion as a Well-Tailored Solution. ........... .............. 781
A. Prong 1: Converting Section 18 Capital Restrictions Under the
1940 Act .................... ................... 781
B. Prong 2: Excluding Fiduciary Investors from Private Fund Access 783
C. Potential Drawbacks and Additional Benefits.... .............. 784
Conclusion ....................................................... 786
INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffett famously won a bet where he predicted that a basket of hedge
funds would underperform a passive S&P 500 index from 2007 to 2017.1 The
S&P 500 passive index earned an annual 7.1 percent gain, whereas the basket of
hedge funds earned 2.2 percent.2 While his bet was limited to a relatively small
basket of hedge funds, several reports and studies imilarly found that the hedge
fund industry as a whole has failed to produce above-market returns for ex-
tended periods of time, particularly since the end of our most recent financial
1. Akin Oyedele, Warren Buffett Has Won His $1 Million Bet Against the Hedge Fund Industry, Bus.
INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2018, 12:33 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-wins-million-
dollar-bet-against-hedge-funds-2018-1.
2. Id.
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crisis of 2007-2009.3 One such study used a dollar-weighted return to evaluate
the performance of nearly 11,000 hedge funds between 1980 to 2008.4 Pursuant
to this methodology, hedge fund returns were significantly "lower than the re-
turns of broad-based [indices] like the S&P500 and only marginally higher
than risk-free rates of return."5 This study, among others, countered the com-
monly held notion that hedge funds provide superior returns due to their man-
agement by highly talented experts who possess exclusive access to innovative
and exotic financial products.'
As background, hedge funds are private investment funds that are restricted to
elite investors, such as wealthy individuals and institutional investors.7 The dis-
appointing returns of hedge funds would be of little concern if only elite inves-
tors were losing capital, with limited exposure to the investing public, which is
generally comprised of retail investors. Such retail investors are not required to
maintain a particular income level or hold a certain amount of net assets. After
all, the federal securities laws are rooted in investor protection principles as they
entitle retail investors to a panoply of protections, such as material disclosures,
antifraud protections, and even restricted access to "risky" instruments.8 These
principles similarly presume that elite hedge fund investors should have the re-
sources to protect themselves, and that regulators should not expend limited re-
sources in protecting such wealthy individuals and prestigious institutions.
Nevertheless, various loopholes under federal securities laws categorize pen-
sion plans, endowments, and other institutional investors that manage pools
of capital on behalf of retail investor beneficiaries (hereinafter, "Fiduciary Inves-
tors") as elite investors that are sufficiently capable of protecting themselves.9
These Fiduciary Investors are therefore free to invest in hedge funds despite
the indirect access passed along to underlying retail investors. Such access
would likewise be of limited concern if Fiduciary Investors were consistently al-
locating to hedge funds that earned above-market returns without having to pay
excessive and/or hidden fees. Yet, as further discussed in Part II of this article,
Fiduciary Investors have consistently increased hedge fund allocations despite
overwhelming evidence of subpar returns and excessive fees.'o The author refers
to this phenomenon as the hedge fund conundrum as it is not easily explained
3. See infra Part II.A (summarizing multiple studies that challenge the abilities of hedge funds to
earn above-market returns under various market conditions).
4. Ilia D. Dichev & Gwen Yu, Higher Risk, Lower Returns: What Hedge Fund Investors Realty Earn,
100 J. FIN. EcON. 248, 252 (2011) (analyzing overall results as well as results during specific time
periods within that timeframe).
5. Id. at 261.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. These elite investors are legally defined as "accredited investors" and "qualified purchasers."
See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text (citing and defining those terms).
8. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.
sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last modified Oct. 1, 2013) (discussing the investor protec-
tion goals of the federal securities laws).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part II.D (providing evidence on increased hedge fund allocations despite excessive fees).
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by basic notions of economic theory which would presume that investors allo-
cate capital in a rational wealth-maximizing manner.
Furthermore, the reasons for such continued allocations seem to be enabled
by the opacity of the hedge fund industry as pension plan trustees can mask con-
flicts of interest or larger problems of underfunded plans by allocating to an in-
dustry that merely "promises" to earn superior returns at some point in the fu-
ture." Trustee decisions to allocate to hedge funds are more politically feasible
as such allocations are not easily scrutinized by policymakers or beneficiaries.
Detailed information regarding hedge fund strategies and fees is largely deemed
confidential and proprietary. In the midst of the political implications of these
decisions, one commentator estimated that pension plans collectively lost
$600 billion over an eight-year period by failing to invest in passive invest-
ments.12 An additional study found that pension plans paid approximately
$4 billion in unreported fees in 2014.'" These misallocations can also perpetuate
wealth inequality by creating opportunities for advisers to earn excessive fees
that do not necessarily match their skillsets in producing superior returns.1
Hedge fund advisers are likewise amongst the highest income earners in the
country. An additional source noted that the "top 25 hedge fund managers
earned more than all the CEOs of the S&P 500 combined."'s
This article thus utilizes an historical institutionalist lens to examine how law-
makers may have enabled a conundrum of this nature. Overall, excessive hedge
fund fees are a symptom of regulatory loopholes where the private hedge fund
market has increased in "publicness" through its increasing access and subse-
quent harm to retail investors. This "retailization" of the industry warrants a
deeper theoretical analysis as to how the definition of publicness has evolved
under federal securities laws, and whether it should be recalibrated given the fi-
nancial innovations and changing market conditions that have led to the harms
discussed herein. Historical institutionalists provide novel approaches for exam-
ining institutional changes of this nature as they encourage scholars to "trace the
processes behind the creation and persistence of institutions and policies."'6
Tracing such historical processes and patterns is helpful in understanding
how current expectations have been molded by the past. Understanding the
11. See id. (explaining how reasons for continued hedge fund allocations are enabled by opacity of
the industry).
12. Leland Faust, Hedge Funds Are No Place for Public Pension Investments, HuFFINGTON POST (June
26, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hedge-funds-are-no-place-for-public-
pension-investments us59513200e4b0326cOa8d0a21.
13. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS INCREASE USE OF COMPLEX INVESTMENTS 2, 18
(2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/04/psrs-state-public-pension-funds-
increase use-oficomplexjinvestments.pdf.
14. See infra Part II.C (summarizing the harms resulting from the hedge fund conundrum, such as
billions of dollars in excessive and/or hidden fees and potentially contributing to the wealth gap).
15. BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: How THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES,
SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 35 (2017).
16. Edwin Amenta & Kelly M. Ramsey, Institutional Theory, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICS: STATE AND
SOCIETY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 15, 16 (Kevin T. Leicht & J. Craig Jenkins eds., 2010).
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historical context in which decisions are made can further guide actors in devel-
oping effective strategies for implementing desired institutional changes.
Professor Kathleen Thelen, a prominent historical institutionalist and Ford
Professor of Political Science at MIT, further developed a subset of this theory
which is commonly referred to as "conversion."" Conversion generally occurs
when political actors redirect institutions to meet new goals, which diverge
from the institution's original purposes.'8 Conversion is apt to occur when un-
derlying rules or policies are ambiguous in nature.'9 In exploring how conver-
sion contributed to the hedge fund conundrum identified in this article, lawmak-
ers initially converted legislative concepts of "publicness" through administrative
regulations that specifically carved out several categories of Fiduciary Investors
as being sufficiently capable of protecting themselves in spite of potential retail
investor exposure.2 0 Professor Jacob S. Hacker, a political science expert at Yale
University, identified an additional process through which the impact of a par-
ticular institutional framework weakens over time due to economic shifts or
other societal changes.21 In broad strokes, "drift" refers to "systematic, prolonged
failures of government to respond to the shifting realities of a dynamic econ-
omy. "22 In exploring how drift further contributed to the hedge fund conun-
drum, lawmakers then failed to update such amended definitions to accommo-
date evolving notions of publicness brought about by increasing harms by
indirect hedge fund exposure to retail investors.
Both conversion and drift provide useful approaches for examining how "hid-
den" changes in political outcomes occur even when their underlying institu-
tions remain intact and relatively stable.23 For instance, investor protection prin-
ciples remain deeply embedded within federal securities laws despite eroding
retail investor protections through indirect access to private fund investments.2 4
These changes also occur during periods of stability, as opposed to being enacted
in response to an exogenous shock or event that often triggers large-scale legislative
17. Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis, in COM-
PARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 208, 225-26 (James Mahoney & Dietrich Ruesche-
meyer eds., 2003).
18. Id.; see also KATHLEEN THELEN, How INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GER-
MANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN 36 (2004) (further describing institutional conversion as
"the adoption of new goals or the incorporation of new groups into the coalitions on which institu-
tions are founded").
19. Jacob S. Hacker, Paul Pierson & Kathleen Thelen, Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces of Insti-
tutional Change, in ADVANCES IN COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 180, 181 (James Mahoney & Kathleen
Thelen eds., 2015).
20. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the extent to which political actors converted original notions of
publicness through the passage of Regulation D in 1982).
21. Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of So-
cial Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 246 (2004).
22. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH
RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 43 (2010).
23. Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 180-82.
24. About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml ( ast mod-
ified Nov. 22, 2016) (providing that the SEC's mission is "to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly,
and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation"); see also infra Part III.
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amendments.25 Many of the institutional shifts discussed in this article have oc-
curred during times of economic stability where repeat player private interest
groups have strategically leveraged opportunities to introduce preferred changes
with little interference from the general populace.2 6
Applying this historical institutional framework is a novel approach for ana-
lyzing the evolution of publicness in the federal securities law space.27 Scholars
have relied on historical institutionalism to dissect hidden changes that have oc-
curred in policies related to welfare benefits, social security, construction regu-
lations, antitrust, and other significant policy shifts.2 8 Historical institutionalism
is a particularly helpful framework in this area of the law given the vast number
of changes that have occurred through legislative and regulatory enactments that
25. See Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 180-82.
26. See infra Part III (analyzing the extent to which political actors enabled conversion and drift
from original notions of publicness despite enduring notions of investor protection within the federal
securities law space).
27. An emerging body of scholarship has explored the inconsistent definitions of "publicness"
under federal securities laws, but limited attention has been dedicated to evaluating the evolution
of publicness through an institutional theory lens. See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation
of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 445 (2017) (providing
commentary of how "the new public-private divide lis] centered on its information effects . . .
Ithough] private companies are thriving in part by freeriding on the information contained in public
company stock prices and disclosure"); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FL. L.
REv. 649, 653 (2015) (proposing to regulate evolving notions of publicness by "refraining the regu-
lation of public companies under U.S. federal securities law around three well-worn regulatory prin-
ciples: (1) suitability, (2) efficiency, and (3) representativeness"); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337,
339, 342-46 (2013) (highlighting inconsistent definitions of "publicness" under federal securities
laws, acknowledging that the "public-private divide has long been an entirely undertheorized aspect
of securities regulation," and further proposing new standards for evaluating publicness under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting "Truth in Securities" Revisited: Abolishing
IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 999, 1001-02 (2013)
(discussing Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966), and arguing
that the inconsistent treatment of "publicness" under the Securities and Exchange Acts creates scenar-
ios where the "transition from private to public will inevitably be awkward, abrupt, and fraught with
problems for issuers, investors, and regulators"); Hillary A. Sale, The New "Public" Corporation, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 137, 137-38 (proposing that many recent scandals result from the
failures of public corporation fiduciaries in understanding their increasing notions of "publicness");
Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69
SMU L. REv. 405, 445 (2016) (arguing that the incoherent definition of publicness results from lay-
ering evolving notions onto ancillary regulation as opposed to amending primary legislation intended
to holistically regulate the investment fund industry); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort,
Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1573,
1574-78 (2013) (focusing on the Securities Act of 1933 in addressing related issues).
28. See, e.g., HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 22, at 42-47 (exploring how drift facilitated policies
that have deepened the wealth gap in the United States); Daniel Beland, Ideas and Institutional Change
in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy Drift, 88 Soc. Sci. Q. 20 (2007) (utilizing an histor-
ical institutionalist lens to examine how social security policy transformed from a family protection
income maintenance program to a model that more closely resembles a privatized system); Hacker,
supra note 21, at 246 (developing drift as a subset of historical institutionalism to explain the evolu-
tion of the welfare state); Jeroen van der Heijden, Through Thelen's Lens: Layering, Conversion, Drift,
Displacement and Exhaustion in the Development of Dutch Construction Regulation 4 (Austl. Nat'l
Univ., Reg. Insts. Network, Paper No. 46, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2497838 (applying an historical institutionalist lens to explore incremental institutional changes
to construction regulation in the Netherlands).
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have effectively altered the definition of "publicness" in the past decades. These
changes have occurred despite enduring notions of investor protection that are
still embedded in federal securities laws and enforced by administrative agencies.
While tenets of rational choice theory can be helpful for evaluating a particular
piece of legislation or regulation in this regard (and such analyses have indeed
been helpful in identifying various limitations of regulatory agencies, such as
the SEC and CFTC),2 9 they have failed to provide a large-scale historical over-
view of how various processes may have impacted the evolving definition of
"publicness" over time. Public choice theory fails to account for the complex
array of justifications that human actors consider in adopting or refraining a par-
ticular institution in this area. Whereas self-interested economic factors may in
fact be a motivating justification, other factors may play a role, such as reducing
regulatory complexity or providing clarity and predictability in interpreting an
ambiguous congressional mandate. An historical institutional lens can likewise
be helpful in developing a well-tailored solution that is responsive to the histor-
ical context in which changes occur. Effective solutions could strategically utilize
conversion as a means to restore certain protections to underlying retail investor
beneficiaries.
Part I begins with a broad overview of investment fund regulation to provide a
foundational backdrop for understanding the public/private dichotomy in this
niche area of the law. It then deconstructs core aspects of the hedge fund indus-
try while highlighting emerging controversies related to systemic risk and retai-
lization. Part II identifies and summarizes the multiple studies that have revealed
the difficulties that hedge funds face in producing above-market returns over ex-
tended periods of time. This section further reveals the hidden fees that hedge
funds often charge its investors, which total billions of dollars in lost capital. Fi-
duciary Investors have collectively increased hedge fund allocations in spite of
these growing concerns. Part III delves into the historical institutionalist analysis
summarized in the preceding paragraphs to explore how lawmakers contributed
to a phenomenon of this nature. Part IV provides preliminary thoughts on a well-
tailored solution that relies on conversion to essentially create a regulated market
for "hedge-fund-like strategies." This would entail loosening the section 18 cap-
ital restrictions that currently apply to registered investment funds so that Fidu-
ciary Investors can access essential opportunities for wealth maximization and
diversification, particularly during declining markets. Such a solution would like-
wise create better mechanisms for more effectively weeding out low-performing
29. See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L.
REv. 745, 750-51 (2013) (applying a modified version of public choice theory to provide a possible
rationale for the SEC's continued passage of regulation that expands private securities markets, while
further highlighting that "regulators will in fact be willing to permit, or even facilitate, the expansion
of the unregulated portion of their industry if, by doing so, they are able to avoid the risk of public
scrutiny that accompanies their next best alternative regulatory strategy"); Jennifer J. Johnson, Private
Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 151, 187 (2010) (arguing that "fs]ome com-
bination of conservative political will fueled by Wall Street contributions and backroom lobbying,
coupled with a possible misunderstanding of private placements, contributed to the ... preemptive
force lof the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996]").
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funds with excessive fees. If, however, Fiduciary Investors continue to allocate to
hedge funds in an inefficient manner, even with the increased access to protection-
ist strategies briefly discussed above, then Congress should consider directly ex-
cluding Fiduciary Investors from accessing private investment funds altogether.
By excluding Fiduciary Investors from certain exemptions of the federal securities
laws, Congress would reinstitute standard investor protections provided by law.
I. GROWING PREVALENCE OF HEDGE FUNDS
Part L.A discusses the primary characteristics of the investment fund industry,
as well as the general registration requirements that apply to mutual funds and
other registered investment company structures. Background material of this na-
ture provides the foundational rubric for understanding how regulation serves to
distinguish public and private investment funds. It also reveals the complexities
that lawmakers face in updating notions of publicness in this industry. Part I.B
deconstructs core characteristics of the hedge fund industry, which is one of the
most popular choices within the realm of private investment funds. It similarly
emphasizes its regulatory structure and proffered benefits. Part I.C explains how
the exponential growth of the industry has led to various controversies related to
the increasing "publicness" of hedge funds in that retail investors are increasingly
exposed to these entities as underlying beneficiaries of Fiduciary Investors.
While other notions of publicness have emerged, such as systemic risk, this ar-
ticle focuses on the retailization of the industry, which has been largely neglected
by scholars and lawmakers as a loophole worth correcting.
A. OVERVIEW OF INVESTMENT FUND REGULATION
Investment funds can provide an ideal mechanism for average investors to
produce meaningful, yet stable returns over extended periods of time. Countless
households therefore rely on this industry to fund various long-term financial
objectives. Such goals can include saving for retirement, paying for college ex-
penses, or purchasing a home.3 0 While the investment fund industry is com-
prised of other types of vehicles, such as exchange-traded funds and unit-invest-
ment trusts, mutual funds tend to be the most popular choice amongst
investors." According to the Investment Company Institute, "[a]n estimated
100 million individual Americans in 56.2 million households owned mutual
funds in mid-2017."32 With respect to retirement savings in particular, "is]ixty-
seven percent of 401(k) assets at year-end 2017 were invested in mutual
30. INV. CO. INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 64 (58th ed. 2018), http://www.icifactbook.org/deployedfiles/
FactBook/Site%20Properties/pdf/2018/2018_factbook.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 56.
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funds."" The mutual fund industry, as a whole, manages a total of $18.7 trillion
in total net assets.3 4
In terms of their structure, mutual funds are created and managed by invest-
ment adviser entities that effectively pool assets from large numbers of share-
holders.35 Mutual fund advisers then invest the resulting pool of assets into bas-
kets of financial instruments, such as equities, bonds, and/or cash instruments.36
A wide variety of mutual funds exist, some of which target a range of companies
depending on their size and/or growth prospects. Mutual funds can also target
fixed-income instruments, such as government securities or corporate bonds.37
Most mutual funds are also sufficiently diversified in an array of issuers so that
investors are not unduly exposed to a trivial number of investments.3 8 Thus, in-
stead of having to select amongst a myriad of companies for investment, mutual
fund shareholders are provided with direct and immediate access to a diversified
pool of assets. Investors similarly receive the benefit of relying on the expertise of
the investment adviser in selecting such investments.39 In exchange for continu-
ously managing a particular fund, the investment adviser receives a management
fee, which can span from 0.5 percent to 2 percent of the total value of its under-
lying pool of assets.40
The public/private dichotomy of the investment fund industry is primarily
rooted in the status of shareholders that are permitted to invest in the pool.4 '
More specifically, investment funds that are open for investment by retail inves-
tors (which generally encompasses the general public) must register under a
complex rubric of federal legislation (also, "Registered Investment Companies"
or "RICs").4 2 Such retail investors are not required to maintain a particular in-
come level or hold a certain amount of net assets. Because of their limited re-
sources, these investors are entitled to the investor protection mechanisms guar-
anteed under the federal securities laws. In particular, once investment advisers
open the door to retail investment, they must register their respective pool(s)
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act"). 4 3 The 1940 Act is
widely known as being the most restrictive and intricate of the federal securities
laws, as it includes detailed disclosure mandates, convoluted restrictions on
"riskier" investments, such as illiquid securities and derivatives, rigid prohibi-
33. Id. at 138.
34. Id. at 58 (reporting figure as of year-end 2017).
35. See 1 THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 1.01 (Matthew Bender, rev.
ed. 2018) (providing a description of investment company structures).
36. Id.
37. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MUTUAL FUNDS AND ETFs: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 13 (2016), http://
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf thereinafter MUTUAL FUND GUIDE].
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id.
40. Adam Hayes, 4. Mutual Funds: The Costs, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
university/mutualfunds/mutualfunds2.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
41. See Martin Shelby, supra note 27, at 423-29 (summarizing predominant indicators of public-
ness that primarily rely on status of investors).
42. See id. at 434-40.
43. 15 U.S.C. Hi 80a-1(b)(1), 80a-24 (2018).
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tions on conflict of interest transactions, and other directives that extend beyond
the "truth in securities"44 framework provided under the inaugural Securities Act
of 1933 ("Securities Act") and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act"). 45
Even still, because mutual fund investors receive "securities" via their owner-
ship interest in the underlying vehicle, such funds must also register under the
Securities Act, unless there is an available exclusion or exemption.4 6 Registration
under this law includes the completion of a detailed prospectus that is publicly
available on the SEC's website, as well as exposure to private causes of action for
any material misstatements and omissions that may appear on this lengthy docu-
ment.47 SEC rules attempt to eliminate redundant disclosure obligations that fall
under both the Securities Act and 1940 Act.4 8
The Exchange Act encompasses additional regulations for "investment com-
pany principal underwriters and others that sell investment company shares,
and requires them to register with the SEC."4 9 RICs similarly fall within the def-
inition of "public company" under the Exchange Act, triggering its periodic dis-
closure requirements, which extend beyond the initial filing of a prospectus.5 0
The definition of public company under the Exchange Act includes: (1) issuers
that have securities listed on an exchange;5 (2) issuers with "total assets" ex-
ceeding $10 million and classes of equity securities held by at least 2,000 per-
sons (or 500 persons who are not accredited investors);5 2 and (3) any issuer
that files a registration statement under the Securities Act.5 3 Investment company
structures could potentially fall under any of these categories of public company
due to their size, number of holders, and/or registration status under the Secu-
rities Act. As a result, RICs must file the periodic reports mandated under the
Exchange Act unless an available exclusion or exemption applies to the under-
lying entity.5 4
Interestingly enough, advisers of RICs must separately register under the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act"). For the sake of clarity, in
addition to the adviser registering itself, such advisers must still register their un-
derlying pools under the 1940 Act, and the Securities and Exchange Acts, unless
there are available exemptions. Moreover, such pools are overseen by a separate
board of directors so as to mitigate any conflicts of interest that may arise
44. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSIONN, supra note 8.
45. See Martin Shelby, supra note 27, at 414-17 (explaining specific restrictions and mandates of
the 1940 Act).
46. 15 U.S.C. Hi 77c, 77e (2018); see id. § 80a-24 (1940 Act).
47. See id. Hi 77j, 771.
48. See id. § 781(g)(2)(B).
49. INV. CO. INST., supra note 30, at 279.
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018).
51. Id. § 781(a).
52. Id. § 781(g)(1).
53. Id. § 78o(d).
54. See id. § 781(g)(2).
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between advisers and their respective pools." The Advisers Act is distinctive in
that it creates a mandatory fiduciary obligation for registered investment advisers
("RIAs") to act in the best interests of their clients when dispensing investment
advice.5 6 RIA clients are further protected by the disclosure requirements pro-
vided under the Advisers Act. RIAs must disclose material information relating
to their business practices, fees, disciplinary history, certain conflicts of interest,
and other material information related to their advisory business.5 7 RIAs must
also create and maintain compliance programs to prevent violations of the Ad-
visers Act, and the SEC has the power to randomly inspect RIAs to ensure com-
pliance with these various provisions.5 8
By and large, the investment fund industry is one of the most regulated indus-
tries in the nation. While the Securities and Exchange Acts create standard dis-
closure obligations for investment fund entities, the 1940 Act includes additional
restrictions on the abilities of such funds to trade risky instruments and to en-
gage in conflict of interest transactions. Regulatory bodies, such as the SEC,
CFTC, and FINRA, implement additional rules that further apply to industry
participants.59 Researchers have posited multiple reasons for this regulatory
complexity, including political maneuverings and limited expertise by regula-
tors.6 0 Although these reasons are largely outside the scope of this article, this
complexity partly explains the hurdles that lawmakers face in updating existing
notions of publicness within this framework, which is further discussed in sub-
sequent sections of this article.
B. HEDGE FUNDs DECONSTRUCTED
Investment funds can avoid the arduous registration requirements discussed
above by complying with one of the many exclusions or exemptions incorpo-
rated into these laws.6 ' Broadly speaking, restricting investments to elite inves-
tors, such as high net worth individuals or institutional investors, permits advis-
ers to operate private investment funds, such as hedge funds, private equity
funds, or venture capital funds ("Private Funds").6 2 Such investors are generally
55. Div. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVEST-
MENT COMPANY REGULATION 251-52 (1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/
icreg50-92.pdf thereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY].
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2018).
57. See id. § 80b-4(b).
58. See id.
59. Cary Martin Shelby, Closing the Hedge Fund Loophole: The SEC as the Primary Regulator of Sys-
temic Risk, 58 B.C. L. REV. 639, 666-67 (2017) (highlighting the fragmented nature of federal secu-
rities laws).
60. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC-A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
537, 552-53 (2009) (exploring historical reasons for division of SEC and CFTC).
61. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 23-32 (2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
hedgefunds0903.pdf thereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS] (summarizing multiple
exemptions that hedge funds must adhere to in order to avoid registration requirements under federal
securities laws).
62. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
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not entitled to certain protections guaranteed under the federal securities laws.6 3
Investors of this stature theoretically have the resources to sufficiently protect
themselves from unscrupulous advisers and riskier investments.6 4 This theoret-
ical approach to the public/private divide was effectuated through a series of reg-
ulations and court rulings that developed over the course of several decades (the
evolution of this regulatory divide will be further discussed through an institu-
tional theory lens in Part III below).65 With this division comes more limited dis-
closure obligations, permissive fee structures, greater access to "riskier" strate-
gies, and looser governance requirements.6 6 Because hedge funds are a
popular choice amongst the several Private Fund options available to Fiduciary
Investors, this article will primarily analyze the unique characteristics of the
hedge fund industry.
With respect to transparency, hedge funds are not required to comply with
the initial and periodic disclosure obligations that would accompany registration
under the Securities Act, Exchange Act, or 1940 Act.6 ' These transparency guar-
antees, which are among the primary goals of the federal securities laws, help to
resolve the information asymmetries that may exist between investors and advis-
ers. For instance, fund advisers may not be incentivized to voluntarily provide
material information about their offered investments if the costs of doing so ex-
ceeds its benefits.68 Mandated disclosures under the Securities and 1940 Acts
therefore provide investors with a wealth of material information related to a
fund's strategies, fees, and valuation procedures.6 ' Even though hedge fund in-
vestors are not guaranteed to receive much of this information, they are free to
negotiate for additional disclosures directly from advisers. Elite investors often
perform extensive due diligence on an assortment of hedge funds before decid-
ing on a particular allocation.70 Many do in fact receive a private placement
memorandum upon subscribing to a hedge fund, which provides comparable in-
formation that would appear in a registration statement.7 ' Any such disclosures
63. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953) (holding that offerings that are
restricted to investors who can fend for themselves are "private" in nature); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(2019) (defining "accredited investors" as individuals who surpass certain income thresholds or high
net worth requirements, as well as a variety of institutions).
64. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 124-27. Note, however, that antifraud protections generally apply.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018).
65. See infra Parts III.B-C (analyzing how the definition of "publicness" evolved under federal se-
curities laws).
66. See id.
67. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 61, at 11-20, 46-52.
68. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 292
(1998).
69. See 1 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 35, § 5.02 (summarizing the extensive initial disclosure require-
ments that apply to registered investment companies).
70. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style,
and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 992 (noting that hedge fund investors, "particularly institutional
investors, engage in active due diligence before investing, routinely retain advisory firms to evaluate
options for them, and negotiate for more disclosure from hedge funds").
71. Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor
Protection, 6 BERKELEY BLt. L.J. 240, 288 (2009) (contending that hedge fund investors have increas-
ingly demanded enhanced transparency from prospective hedge fund investments).
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are further subject to the general antifraud protections under the federal securi-
ties laws.72 Nevertheless, the disclosures received by investors can vary across
funds because they are not standardized.73 This could make it difficult for
even the most sophisticated of elite investors to optimize hedge fund selec-
tions.7 4 Access to transparency likewise depends on the bargaining power of in-
vestors as hedge fund advisers are not obligated to provide any such information
to investors.
Hedge funds are typically organized as pass-through tax entities, such as lim-
ited partnerships or limited liability companies, because they enjoy looser gov-
ernance requirements under 1940 Act exemptions.75 More specifically, they
are not required to have a separate board of directors to oversee potential con-
flicts of interest between the investment adviser and its fund.7 ' This provides
hedge fund advisers with the freedom to select more favorable business associ-
ation structures to operate their underlying funds.7 7 Moreover, hedge funds are
not subject to the standardized valuation requirements provided under the 1940
Act.7' Even if fund disclosures provide detailed valuation procedures, advisers
often grant themselves the ability to deviate from such procedures in their dis-
cretion.79 These flexible valuation standards expand the categories of instru-
ments that can be traded by hedge fund advisers on behalf of their funds.8 0
They effectively enable advisers to trade illiquid instruments without facing
the same liability risks as mutual fund boards.8 '
Even more importantly, hedge funds are unconstrained by the 1940 Act re-
strictions on trading "riskier" financial instruments and strategies. Consistent
with the paternalistic nature of the federal securities laws, the 1940 Act severely
restricts the extent to which RICs can trade in derivatives8 2 or engage in lever-
aged transactions.83 Because such transactions may expose retail investors to
72. Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 713-14 (2000)
(synopsizing the antifraud protections that extend to private investment fund investors).
73. See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A Proposal to Expand
Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 87, 113-24 (2012) (high-
lighting how lack of standardization with respect to valuations and risk present unique investor pro-
tection concerns for hedge fund investors who subsequently face heightened challenges in optimizing
hedge fund allocations given the thousands of available options).
74. Id. at 119.
75. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE
Hi 2:8, 2:9 (2018).
76. Id. § 2:8 ("A limited partnership has a general partner ... which is responsible for overall man-
agement of the fund .... and numerous limited partners that are relatively passive investors."); id.
§ 2:9 ("Rather than having a general partner, an LLC typically has one or more managing members,
which have limited liability.").
77. Id. §§ 2:8, 2:9.
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2019); Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from
Hedge Fund Managers' Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 3251, 3268 (2009).
79. See Sklar, supra note 78, at 3268-69.
80. See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, § 4:19.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.; THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKT5., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/
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excessive losses, mutual fund strategies are mostly limited to equities, bonds, and
cash instruments.8 4 Hedge funds on the other hand can trade a wide range of
exotic derivatives, illiquid instruments, and non-U.S. investments in an effort
to chase "alpha," which refers to above-average returns that exceed a predeter-
mined benchmark, such as the S&P500 index." These flexibilities also grant
hedge funds the unfettered ability to utilize derivatives to protect underlying
portfolios against declining markets.8 " For example, a hedge fund adviser
could simultaneously take long and short positions on behalf of its funds, within
the same class of instruments, without having to comply with the 1940 Act re-
strictions briefly discussed above.8 7 A strategy of this nature enables such advis-
ers to guarantee "absolute returns" irrespective of market performance.88 Hedge
funds have relied on these flexibilities to create an entire universe of strategies
that are simply unavailable to their mutual fund counterparts. Common hedge
fund strategies include market neutral, global macro, opportunistic, emerging
markets, and distressed securities, to name a few. 8 9
Hedge fund advisers also have greater latitude in charging additional layers of
fees in comparison to registered funds. Under an exemption provided under the
Advisers Act, hedge fund advisers are permitted to charge a performance fee,
which is a percentage of the actual profits earned by a particular pool.9 o Perfor-
mance fees, which can frequently constitute 20 to 50 percent of a fund's profits,
are also commonly known as incentive fees or carried interest.9 Such advisers
receive this fee in addition to the management fee, which is a fixed percentage
of the pool's net assets.9 2 While performance fees can incentivize hedge fund ad-
visers to produce absolute returns, they can similarly induce advisers to pursue
excessively risky strategies.9 3 An additional controversy, which is largely outside
the scope of this article, relates to the favorable tax treatment that such fees re-
Documents/hedgfund.pdf. The amount of leverage employed by a particular hedge fund is only lim-
ited to the extent requested by its actual counterparties. See id. at 13. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18
(2018) (imposing capital structure requirements on issuances by registered closed-end companies).
84. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 37, at 4.
85. See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, § 4:19.
86. JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES FOR THE NEW MARKETPLACE 15-16, 62-
67 (1999).
87. See id. at 65.
88. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 61, at 33-36.
89. Dion Friedland, Synopsis of Hedge Fund Strategies, MAGNUM FUNDS, http://www.magnum.coml
hedgefunds/strategies.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2018) (generally prohibiting registered investment advisers from
charging performance based fees); 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a), (d)(1) (2019) (providing that advisers
who restrict investments to "qualified clients" are permitted to charge performance-based fees, and
defining "qualified clients" to include a "natural person who, or a company that, immediately after
entering into the contract has at least $1,000,000 under the management of the investment adviser").
91. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, H§ 1:1, 3:30, 13:21.
92. Id. § 1:1.
93. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/
investor/alerts/ib-hedgefunds.pdf; see also NICHOLAS, supra note 86, at 165.
Dissecting the Hedge Fund Conundrum 749
ceive under the U.S. Tax Code.9 4 The research regarding the extent to which
these fees are excessive is discussed at length in Part II of this article.
C. EXORBITANT GROWTH AND EMERGING CONTROVERSIES
The expansive investment liberties afforded to hedge funds caused the indus-
try to grow exponentially over the past decades. Elite investors would often flock
to this industry as these investment freedoms created a gateway for advisers to
earn astronomical returns while accessing innovative strategies. One of the
first hedge funds, which was created by Alfred Winslow Jones in the late
1940s, "gained 670% [over a 10-year period], compared with a 358% gain for
the leading mutual fund of the [same] period."9 5 Mr. Winslow utilized a "hedg-
ing" strategy where he short traded stocks that he predicted would decline in
value, while engaging in offsetting long positions for stocks that he predicted
would increase in value.9' He would frequently rely on leverage to fund many
of his short trades as a mechanism to magnify returns.9 7 Mutual funds are re-
stricted from using a comparable strategy as shorting a high level of stocks
would run afoul of the 1940 Act restrictions on leverage.
In 1968, there were approximately 200 hedge funds in existence in the United
States, most of which utilized a strategy similar to the one founded by Mr. Jones.9 8
While the industry's growth was volatile due to several market fluctuations in sub-
sequent decades, it experienced a significant expansion in the 1990s.9 This likely
resulted from a number of factors such as an overall increase in wealth, innovative
developments with respect to financial instruments and strategies, and the creation
of additional regulatory loopholes (which is further discussed in Part III below). 00
As of the end of 2017, over 8,335 hedge funds existed, and they utilize a heter-
ogenous blend of strategies.'0' Around the same time period, the industry's
total assets under management in the United States grew to $3.211 trillion.1 0 2
This figure represents "the sixth consecutive quarterly peak of assets under man-
agement" according to data published by Hedge Fund Research.0 3
94. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (summarizing favorable tax treatment that ap-
plies to performance fees, also referred to as "carried interest").
95. Rachael Levy, The Amazing Story Behind the World's First Hedge Fund, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 22,




98. Hedge Fund Basics: History, MANAGED FUNDS AsS'N, https://www.managedfunds.org/hedge-
fund-investors/history/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see infra Part III (discussing political and economic climate that facilitated the passage of
additional registration loopholes under the 1940 Act).
101. Christine Williamson, Hedge Fund Assets End 2017 at Record $3.2 Trillion-HFR, PENSIONS &
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Amid this exorbitant growth, hedge funds started to increase in "publicness"
as the impact of hedge fund activities started to overflow into the public
sphere.'0 4 One aspect of this public encroachment involves the possibility of
hedge funds creating negative externalities that could cripple the broader econ-
omy. Such externalities generally occur when unrelated third parties, or the
economy as a whole, have to pay the cost for an economic decision for which
they were not a direct party.'0 5 These kinds of scenarios create glaring market
inefficiencies that should be corrected by regulatory action. Private entities,
along with their investors, should presumably have the capacity to absorb any
losses that result from underlying trading decisions gone awry. However, with
the near failure of Long-Term Capital Management ("LTCM") in 1998, regulators
quickly discovered that hedge funds could potentially fall into the "too big to
fail" category of financial institutions.'0 6 More specifically, because hedge
funds are unconstrained by regulatory limits on leverage and derivatives trading,
their underlying activities can generate and transmit systemic risk to the broader
financial system.0 7 In fact, LTCM was so heavily leveraged that it was set to de-
fault on over $1 trillion of contracts with its investment banking counterpar-
ties.10s If LTCM did in fact default on these contracts, then its investment bank-
ing counterparties would have likely gone into liquidation. The Federal Reserve
was then forced to orchestrate a deal amongst these banks to prevent the cascad-
ing failures of these multiple banking entities.' Allowing them to fail would
have surely toppled the global economy.
However, regulators refrained from imposing any additional regulation on
hedge funds. The general public was therefore left to rely on the markets in mit-
igating this growing systemic risk threat by perhaps implementing privately en-
forced limits on leverage. This regulatory inaction paved the way for yet an ad-
ditional systemic risk event to occur in the coming years. On the eve of the
2007-2009 financial crisis, "Bear Sterns Companies, the investment bank,
pledged up to $3.2 billion in loans . . . to bail out one of its hedge funds that
104. See Martin Shelby, supra note 27, at 430-34 (evaluating the extent to which hedge funds in-
creased in publicness due to systemic risk and retailization).
105. Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 18,
2018), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm.
106. THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTs., supra note 83, at 12; see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN
GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (documenting the events
that led to the near failure of Long-Term Capital Management, which had a staggering debt-to-equity
ratio of over twenty-five to one).
107. Systemic risk is not defined under the federal securities laws, but scholars have offered var-
ious definitions. For instance, Professor Steven Schwarcz, Duke University School of Law, defines
systemic risk, in his often cited piece, as "the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or in-
stitutional failure triggers (through panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the
cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market volatil-
ity." Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
108. THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTs., supra note 83, at 12-14, 29.
109. Id. at 13-14.
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was collapsing because of bad bets on subprime mortgages.""0 Shortly following
this hedge fund bailout, Bear Sterns Companies failed and was subsequently
purchased byjPMorgan Chase."' Although the causes of the 2007-2009 finan-
cial crisis are extremely complex and multi-faceted, the failure of Bear Sterns
Companies precipitated a severe loss of investor confidence that reverberated
throughout the economy. This massive decline in investor confidence likely con-
tributed to the debilitating credit freeze, which was one of the most insidious
characteristics of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Moreover, the financial crisis
revealed the heightened risk of contagion as seemingly uncorrelated strategies
and financial institutions experienced concurrent losses.112
Another means through which hedge funds have increased in publicness is
through "retailization" where a mounting number of retail investors are indi-
rectly exposed to hedge funds through institutional investments. " Pension
plans and endowments, for example, are the primary drivers of the growth of
the hedge fund industry, even though their ultimate beneficiaries are mostly
comprised of retail investors. One source estimated that, "[m]ore than half of
the $3 trillion held in hedge funds nationwide is pension fund and retirement
plan investments."14 With respect to other categories of investors, an additional
survey found that, in 2017, "[e]ighty-three percent of endowments and 66% of
foundations invest[ed] in hedge funds.""5 This phenomenon does not consti-
tute a negative externality because retail investors are indirectly in contractual
privity with the institutional investors making such hedge fund allocations.
Yet, because the public/private dichotomy under our federal securities laws is
primarily rooted in the status of investors, the growing access by retail investors
to such private entities entails a heightened degree of publicness from a regula-
tory perspective. In applying this framework to retailization, one could equally
assume that Fiduciary Investors have the institutional and financial resources
to sufficiently protect underlying retail investor beneficiaries from excessive
risks because such investors are considered "elite investors" under federal secu-
rities laws. Nevertheless, reports have surfaced that reveal the difficulties that
pension plan trustees and other Fiduciary Investors face in understanding the
complexities of hedge fund strategies or fee structures."' As will be discussed
110. Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html.
111. Andrew Ross Sorkin,JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share jor Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html.
112. See, e.g., Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?
Evidence from Factors and Transactions Data, 14 J. FIN. MKcs. 1, 2-3 (2011) (providing evidence that
hedge funds experienced concurrent losses even though underlying strategies were seemingly uncor-
related, demonstrating increasing contagion within the industry).
113. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 61, at 80-83.
114. Barry Ritholtz, Hedge-Fund Mediocrity Is the Best Magic Trick, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-15/hedge-funds-underperform-yet-keep-
attracting-pension-fund-money (quoting Leland Faust, CSI Capital Management).
115. Press Release, Prequin, Largest Hedge Fund Investors Hold Outsize Influence (Mar. 28,
2018), http://docs.preqin.com/press/HF-Investors-Mar-18.pdf.
116. See infra Part IID.
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in Part 11 below, pension plans are also increasingly investing in hedge fund en-
tities in spite of growing evidence of their excessive fees and subpar returns.
II. DISSECTING THE HEDGE FUND CONUNDRUM
One of the most prevalent harms that has resulted from retailization is the
hedge fund conundrum. This article loosely defines this conundrum as a phe-
nomenon where Fiduciary Investors continue to increase allocations to hedge
funds, despite overwhelming evidence that hedge fund fees are excessive in com-
parison to lower cost alternatives, at least since the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
Part II.A summarizes multiple studies that have examined the extent to which
hedge fund fees are indeed excessive in comparison to lower cost substitutes,
such as index funds, actively traded mutual funds, and even treasury bills.
Part I.B investigates the extent to which hedge funds are charging hidden fees
which further reduces returns. While at least some Fiduciary Investors have at-
tempted to negotiate fee reductions via contract, these protections are limited
due to varying degrees of bargaining power amongst institutional investors as
well as a lack of standardization regarding the mechanisms through which
such fees are calculated. Part II.C then illuminates the harms that result from
the hedge fund conundrum, such as the loss of billions of dollars resulting
from the misallocation of limited retail investor capital into excessively expensive
vehicles, and the possibility that this conundrum has perpetuated wealth in-
equality within the investment advisory industry. Part lI.D concludes by identi-
fying the possible reasons for continued hedge fund allocations by pension plan
trustees, the predominant category of Fiduciary Investors. Such justifications in-
clude the growing pressure to produce alpha, the complications related to pen-
sion plan trustees complying with elusive fiduciary duties under state law, and
potential conflict of interest transactions between plan trustees and hedge
fund advisers. It then explains how each of these reasons is enabled by the per-
vasive opacity of the hedge fund industry. With respect to seeking returns that
exceed market performance, for example, trustees may view hedge fund alloca-
tions as the more politically feasible approach because their proprietary nature
makes it more difficult for policymakers to scrutinize such decisions.
A. INABILITY TO BEAT THE MARKETS
Scholars mainly rely on hedge fund indices to evaluate the profitability of the
industry which in itself poses several limitations. For one, these indices rely on
hedge funds that are "self-reporting" because these entities are not required to
disclose returns pursuant to any regulatory mandate."7 This creates self-
selection biases in that hedge funds with superior performance may be incentiv-
ized to report returns to indices, as compared to funds with subpar performance
117. Salvatore Bruno & Robert Whitelaw, Selecting a Hedge Fund Replication Approach: Some Factors to
Consider, J. INDEXES, May-June 2012, at 40, 43, pages.stern.nyu.edu/-rwhitela/papers/HF%20Replication
%20Jol%202012.pdf.
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that may refrain from doing so."" Thus, widely used hedge fund indices are not
likely to provide a wholistic snapshot of the industry in its entirety."' The ways
in which valuations and fees are measured are also not subject to standardized
methodologies, making it difficult to effectively compare a range of funds.12 0 Al-
ternative valuation methodologies available to hedge fund advisers could effec-
tively skew the comparisons of funds even if such funds are employing compa-
rable strategies and reporting identical returns. Hedge fund strategies that rely on
complex derivatives and/or other illiquid instruments may further produce re-
turns that are non-linear, making the use of an index to report such returns
less than ideal.121
Scholars have attempted to control for these limitations as studies have be-
come more sophisticated over time. In applying these more sophisticated analy-
ses, a sizable body of research concluded that hedge funds could in fact exceed
market and/or mutual fund returns, particularly prior to the financial crisis of
2007-2009.122 After surveying the existing literature around this time period,
one such study concluded that hedge fund performance exceeded that of mutual
funds in part due to innovative trading strategies.123 This author did however
predict that hedge fund and mutual fund performance would begin converging
as the hedge fund industry became more saturated, making the prospect of pro-
ducing alpha increasingly competitive.12 4
Additional studies began to emerge which challenged these empirical conclu-
sions regarding the superiority of hedge funds as an asset class.125 One such
118. William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 22, 24 ("IP]resumably, only those funds that have 'good' performance
and are looking to attract new investors want to be included in a database. Therefore, hedge funds in
a database tend to have better performance than those that were excluded.").
119. Id.
120. William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge Fund Benchmarks: A Risk Based Approach, FIN. ANA-
LYSTSJ., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 65, 65 ("The opaqueness of hedge fund operations ... and a lack of per-
formance-reporting standards make it hard to formulate expectations for hedge fund performance
that reflect the current economic outlook.").
121. See Dichev & Yu, supra note 4, at 249.
122. See, e.g., Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally & David Ravenscraft, The Performance of Hedge
Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 870 (1999) ("The] combination of incentive align-
ment and investment flexibility gives hedge funds a clear performance advantage over mutual
funds."); Martin Eling & Roger Faust, The Performance of Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds in Emerging
Markets, 34 J. BANKING &FIN. 1993, 1994 (2010) ("Emerging marketh]edge fund returns and alphas
are much higher than those of traditional mutual fundsf, and s]ome hedge funds outperform tradi-
tional benchmarks, whereas most mutual funds tend to underperform traditional benchmarks."). See
generally Vikas Agarwal, Kevin A. Mullally & Narayan Y. Naik, The Economics and Finance of Hedge
Funds: A Review of the Academic Literature, 10 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 1 (2015) (summarizing a number
of studies on this topic which have generally concluded that hedge funds have outperformed mutual
funds, even after accounting for fees and biases in hedge fund indices).
123. Rene M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 175,
180-81, 187 (discussing regulations that limit certain trading strategies by mutual funds, which reg-
ulations are inapplicable to hedge funds).
124. Id. at 190-92.
125. See, e.g., Juha Joenvaara et al., Hedge Fund Performance: What Do We Know? 30 (Dec. 18,
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1989410
(Utilizing "a novel and replicable methodology to aggregate hedge fund databases land concluding
that] . . . hedge fund average returns are upward biased if a researcher uses only one of the commer-
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study utilized a dollar-weighted return for evaluating returns, as opposed to the
buy-and-hold assumption that was implicit in many hedge fund indices.12 6 The
buy-and-hold methodology assumes that investors simply maintain a particular
hedge fund allocation for the duration of time being reported to the index.12 7 in
reality, investors tend to invest more money later in the fund's life while often
increasing contributions during periods in which hedge funds are reporting
higher returns.128 As such, the dollar-weighted return methodology is "value-
weighted over time by the amount of invested capital[,] thus . . . properly re-
flectling] the effect of the timing and magnitude of fund flows on investor re-
turns."129 After applying this dollar-weighted methodology to close to 11,000
hedge funds during the time periods between 1980 to 2008, this study con-
cluded as follows:
[Tihe main finding is that dollar-weighted investor retums are about 3% to 7%
lower than fund returns, depending on specification and time period examined.
This difference is economically large, and it is enough to reverse the conclusions
of existing studies which show outperformance in hedge fund returns. In addition,
the estimated dollar-weighted returns are rather modest in absolute magnitude; for
example, they are reliably lower than the returns of broad-based indexes like the
S&P 500 and only marginally higher than risk-free rates of return. . . . [Allso ...
dollar-weighted returns are more variable than buy-and-hold returns although the
magnitude of this effect is economically modest. Thus, the risk-retum profile of
hedge fund investors seems much worse than previously thought.130
Reconciling these findings with the growing popularity of hedge funds amongst
institutional investors, such as pension plans and endowments, was indeed trou-
bling given the sheer magnitude of potential losses passed along to retail investor
beneficiaries.
Simon Lack used a comparable methodology to further scrutinize hedge fund
returns in his book titled The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and
Why It's Too Good to Be True.' 3 ' Lack relied on the Hedge Fund Research Global
Hedge Fund Index ("HFRX") to evaluate returns from 1998 to 2010.132 During
this time period, the HFRX index reported an annual return of 7.3 percent for
the industry, while the S&P500 yielded a 5.9 percent return, Treasury bills
earned 3.0 percent, and blue chip corporate bonds earned 7.2 percent on an an-
nual basis.'3 3 However, Lack notes that the returns documented by HFRX "are
cial databases, because databases differ in their coverage of under-performing funds ... tand] after
correcting for data biases-including the aforementioned positive database selection bias-a typical
hedge fund or the industry as a whole delivers significant abnormal returns before fees but not after
fees, suggesting that fund managers extract the majority of the rents.").
126. See Dichev & Yu, supra note 4, at 250.
127. Id. at 249-50.
128. Id. at 249.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 261.
131. See SIMON LACK, THE HEDGE FUND MIRAGE: THE ILLUSION OF BIG MONEY AND WHY IT's Too GOOD TO
BE TRUE (2012).
132. Id. at 6-7.
133. Id. at 7.
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all based on the simple average return each year [and that the] hedge fund in-
dustry routinely calculates returns based on the value of $1 invested at incep-
tion."' 3 4 This is problematic because hedge funds tend to perform better in
their earlier years, when assets can be more easily deployed by advisers in re-
sponse to varying market conditions. As a whole, the industry performed better
during its earlier years while leveling off in later years. Investors who increased
allocations during these later years likely suffered individual losses that are not
easily reflected in the average returns that are reported to indices.
As such, Lack adjusted the HFRX figures to incorporate asset-weighted returns
which more accurately reflect the amount of money invested during each re-
ported time period. 13 When Lack adjusted the HFRX in this manner, the annual
return for the hedge fund industry plummeted to 2.1 percent.13 6 In applying this
same methodology to other benchmarks, the S&P500 would have declined to
1.1 percent, corporate bonds would have yielded 6.3 percent, and Treasury
bills would have dipped to 2.3 percent.'37 While Lack's adjusted hedge fund re-
turns would have still exceeded the S&P500 by a slim margin, they were well
below the risk-free rate provided by Treasury bills. As he emphasized at the out-
set of his book, "[i] f all the money that's ever been invested in hedge funds had
been put in treasury bills instead, the results would have been twice as good."'38
He further noted that any combination of equities and bonds would have likely
exceeded the performance of hedge funds. '39
Some commentators disagreed with various nuances of these findings and ag-
gressively defended the industry's ability to earn above-market returns. One
study in particular criticized Lack's selection of the HFRX because it was created
in 2000 and thus input historic returns that could be "suspect."140 This study
further noted that HFRX provided "a low estimate of the actual hedge fund av-
erage returns relative to those reported by most traditionally used hedge fund
indices," while simultaneously acknowledging the limitations of selecting any
such index for measuring hedge fund performance. '4 In applying Lack's
method of incorporating asset-weighted returns to these more traditional indices
(such as Barclays and CSFB), the authors concluded that, "the hedge fund index
IRR . . . would have been at least twice the approximately 3% risk free return
benchmark ... and more than three times greater than the IRR return of the
HFRX Global Hedge Index . . . reported by Lack. "142 The authors additionally
remind readers that the hedge fund industry is extremely heterogeneous and
134. Id.
135. Id. at 10-12.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Id. at 12-13.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Thomas Schneeweis & Hossein Kazemi, An Academic Response to the "Hedge Fund Mirage"
7 (Sept. 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228851 (criticizing the
methodologies utilized by the author of The Hedge Fund Mirage).
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id.
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encompasses an entire universe of distinctive strategies. Some strategies offer
protection in declining equity/bond markets, due to their access to derivatives
and other exotic instruments, while others permit participation in such markets
when they are increasing in value.'4 3 Reviewing the returns of the entire industry
also poses limitations in effectively evaluating whether to invest in a particular
fund given the possibility of fluctuating market conditions that may occur in
the future, such as changing interest rates or volatility in the stock market.' 44
Nevertheless, as the United States entered into an extended bull market that
has lasted close to a decade, the hedge fund industry has encountered height-
ened challenges in earning above-market returns during this time period.14 5
As the New York Times recently summarized, "Iflor eight consecutive years,
hedge funds have disappointed, underperforming a roaring stock market."'4 6
CEM Benchmarking published an extensive study that "aggregated institutional
portfolios with a hedge fund allocation history longer than five years and com-
pared it to a custom equity/debt portfolio constructed from each plan's specific
allocation.""'4 It concluded that, between 2000 and 2016, "net of costs, the asset
class fail[ed] to add value over a traditional equity/bond portfolio."' 4" An addi-
tional academic study examined the extent to which a comprehensive set of
twenty-six performance predictors, such as predictors related to managerial
skill and timing, could be used to forecast superior hedge fund performance be-
tween 1997 and 2016.' The study further consolidated data from six available
hedge fund indices and concluded that none of its identified predictors could
select a 20 percent allocation to hedge funds that significantly improved the per-
formance of a standard stock/bond portfolio during the 2008-2016 period.'50
Even certain hedge fund industry participants acknowledge that this period
has been difficult for the industry. Daniel S. Loeb referenced this period as
being "catastrophic" after managers lost billions of dollars resulting from un-
anticipated market swings.' 5' Toward the end of 2018, the industry suffered
additional challenges as "[h]edge-fund aggregate performance was down 2%
143. See id. at 3.
144. Id. at 4-5.
145. Roger Aitken, Why Invest in Hedge Funds If They Don't Outperform the Market?, FORBES (Jan. 21,
2015, 12:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2015/01/21/why-invest-in-hedge-funds-
if-they-dont-outperform-the-market ("The S&P 500 total return index in fact outperformed almost
every hedge fund out there in the three years through June 2014.").
146. Alexandra Stevenson, Hedge Fund Managers Don't Always Beat the Market, but They Still Make
Billions, N.Y. TIMEs (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/business/dealbook/best-
paid-hedge-fund-managers.html.




149. Nicolas P.B. BollenJuhaJoenvaara & Mikko Kauppila, Picking Winners? Selecting Hedge Funds
for a Diversified Portjolio 2-3 (Vanderbilt Owen Graduate Sch. of Mgmt., Paper No. 3034283, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034283.
150. Id. at 29-30.
151. See Stevenson, supra note 146.
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through the end of November [2018], thanks in part to a decline of 3.1% in
October [2018] alone."15 2
In summary, most would agree that hedge funds have encountered significant
difficulties in earning superior returns during the historic bull market that has
characterized the markets over the past decade or so. However, scholars and
commentators are slightly more divided with respect to whether hedge funds
can earn superior returns in declining markets. These private entities are
known for outperforming the markets during economic downturns given their
increased freedoms to engage in short-trading and other "hedging" strategies.
As one source noted, "[d]islocated markets, bear markets, inefficient markets
are where hedge funds tend to do best, and these have not been the overall con-
ditions during the slow and fragile recovery starting in 2009."',1 In terms of how
hedge funds performed in the midst of our last financial crisis, one source esti-
mated that, in 2008, "global equities lost 42 percent of their value while hedge
funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 19 percent for their investors and
with lower monthly volatility."' 5 4 Professor Houman Shadab further noted that,
"[h]edge funds use short sales and derivatives to manage risk and reduce losses
when the overall market is performing poorly. This practice is difficult for mu-
tual funds because of the legal restrictions on their investment activities." 1 Ev-
idence has nonetheless emerged that institutional investors have encountered
difficulties in selecting high performing hedge fund managers. '5 6 To the extent
that hedge funds can provide additional protections during declining markets,
additional transparency guarantees under the federal securities laws would
greatly assist Fiduciary Investors in optimizing hedge fund selections during
these time periods.
B. HIDDEN FEES AND LIMITED IMPACT OF CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS
Irrespective of this ongoing debate regarding when and how hedge funds can
earn superior returns, legitimate concerns have also arisen regarding the costs of
selecting hedge funds as well as the extent to which hedge funds charge hidden
152. Bradley Saacks, A Surge in Shutdowns, Lagging Performance, and Slashed Fees: Hedge Funds Have
Had a Brutal 6 Months, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/surge-
shutdown-bad-performance-slashed-fees-2018-brutal-hedge-fund-2018-12.
153. Brian Robinson, How Pension Plans Can Build the Case for Hedge Funds, PENSIONS & INVs. (Nov.
30, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20161130/ONLINE/I16113999 1/how-pension-
plans-can-build-the-case-for-hedge-funds.
154. Shadab, supra note 71, at 243-44 (citing CREDIT SUISSE TREMONT, ONE FOR THE RECORD BOOKS:
HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE IN 2008 1 (2009)).
155. Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis 2 (N.Y. Law Sch. Legal Studies,
Paper No. 9/10 #31, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1564847.
156. See, e.g., The Hedge-Fund Delusion that Grips Pension-Fund Managers, ECONOMIST (Jan. 18,
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/01/18/the-hedge-fund-delusion-
that-grips-pension-fund-managers ("Clients may think they will be able to pick the best hedge-
fund managers, not the average ones. But one group of professionals-fund-of-fund managers-
tries to do just that. They did manage to pip the average asset-weighted return of hedge funds in
2017, but failed to do so in any of the previous four years. If the experts cannot manage to pick
the winners, why should a pension fund or endowment be able to manage the feat?").
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fees which may not be reflected in reported returns. Most reputable indices ad-
mittedly require its listed hedge funds to report performance figures net of fees.
This means that reported figures should at least exclude the fixed management
fee and any variable incentive fees."' Anti-fraud provisions under the Advisers
Act also require both registered and exempt advisers to deduct "advisory fees,
brokerage or other commissions, and any other expenses that a client would
have paid or actually paid" from any actual performance figures that are dis-
closed to investors."' Even with these requirements, the costs of performing ad-
equate due diligence on potential and ongoing hedge fund allocations is quite
significant given the complexities involved in understanding strategies, fee struc-
tures, and corresponding risks. As Lack notes:
Deciding which treasury bill to buy is not a particularly taxing job, but selecting
hedge funds requires either a significant investment in a team of hedge fund ana-
lysts, risk management, due diligence, and financial experts, or the use of a hedge
fund of funds that employs the same expertise. Either way, it costs an additional
0.5 to 1.0 percent annually for an investor to be in hedge funds, whether through
fees paid to the hedge fund or funds manager or increased overhead of an invest-
ment team.' 9
Retaining sufficient expertise to select and monitor hedge funds is ultimately an
expensive enterprise. Hedge funds can trade exotic and complex financial instru-
ments that could yield inconsistent valuations. Deciphering hedge fund fees pre-
sents additional hurdles as there is no mandated standardized format for report-
ing these often intricate layers of fees.
Numerous reports have also emerged of institutional investors having to un-
expectedly pay for unreported fees, such as accruals of performance fees, costs
associated with monitoring hedge fund investments, or portfolio company
fees.'60 In April 2017, a report published by PEW Charitable Trusts measured
the average unreported fees for the seventy-three largest state-sponsored pension
plans in the United States.'6' It shockingly found that these pension plans are
paying approximately $4 billion in such unreported fees on an annual
basis.16 2 Thus, even if pension plans can successfully select high-performing
hedge funds, returns may be adversely impacted by potential unaccounted-for
fees. Although pension plans can potentially sue hedge funds for charging hid-
157. HFRI Index Methodology, HEDGE FUND RES., INC., https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/hfri-
index-methodology (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
158. Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, File No. 801-27041 (Oct. 28, 1986),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/clovercapitall02886.htm; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4)
(2018); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-i (2019).
159. LACK, supra note 131, at 13.
160. Edward Siedle, Pensions Unaware Hidden Real Estate Fees Dwarf Those Disclosed, FORBEs
(June 16, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsiedle/2016/06/16/pensions-
unaware-hidden-real-estate-fund-fees-dwarf-disclosed-fees/#410140071961; Yves Smith, SEC: More
than Half the Private Equity Firms Gouge on Fees, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.
nakedcapitalism.com/2014/04/sec-half-private-equity-firms-gouge-fees.html.
161. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 13, at 2.
162. See id. at 27.
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den fees, such litigation can be difficult to prove because institutional investors
are supposed to be well positioned to sufficiently protect themselves under fed-
eral securities laws. Litigation can further lead to additional costs in administer-
ing the pension plan that adversely affect underlying beneficiaries.
Several institutional investors have indeed responded to these subpar returns by
negotiating for lower hedge fund fees directly with underlying advisers. One source
estimated that hedge fund management fees have collectively fallen 13 basis points
with average incentive fees declining 78 basis points since 2014.163 A recent
Goldman Sachs survey similarly found that hedge funds, on average, charge a
1.5 percent management fee and a 17 percent incentive fee.16 4 Moreover, Fiduciary
Investors can negotiate that such incentive fees only be paid after the hedge fund
exceeds a certain benchmark, such as the S&P500. Hedge fund advisers have fre-
quently agreed to such modifications. After all, sophisticated investors of this nature
should be well-positioned to sufficiently protect themselves given their access to
innumerable financial and institutional resources.
Yet, these collective declines in fees are perhaps insufficient given the lower-
costs alternatives of allocating to passive index funds, which can have expense
ratios as low as 0.05 percent.'6 5 Numerous hedge fund investors have also
agreed to historic fee models as one survey revealed that "[a]round one in 10
investors paid a management fee of 2 per cent or more while almost a quarter
(23 percent) stumped up a 20 per cent performance fee [in 2017]."166 Perhaps
some hedge fund advisers are deserving of this higher fee structure given partic-
ularized abilities to earn superior returns. The more likely scenario is that the
ability to negotiate lower fees depends on the bargaining power of institutional
investors. In a similar vein, many institutional investors may not have the suffi-
cient expertise and/or foresight to negotiate for fees that are more reflective of
risk/return profile that hedge funds produce across varying market conditions.
The constrained transparency with respect to hedge fund fees likewise presents
challenges in negotiating for lower fees as they are not universally reported or
calculated in a standardized format.
C. RESULTING HARMS
The resulting costs of potential misallocations to excessively expensive vehi-
cles by pension plans and other institutional investors are significant. These
costs ultimately get passed down to underlying retail investors in the form of re-
duced retirement benefits or possible taxpayer bailouts of pension plans that are
unduly reliant on these vehicles. Such retail investors are supposed to be entitled
163. Chris Flood, Hedge Funds Forced to Cut Fees to Lure Investors, FIN. TIMEs (Feb. 18, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/b889c3b8-1254-1 e8-940e-08320fc2a277.
164. Ted Seides, The Hedge Fund Fee Conundrum, INSTITUTIONAL INV'R (June 1, 2018), https://www.
institutionalinvestor.com/article/bl8g7tfmmmjvj 7/the-hedge-fund-fee-conundrum.
165. Stephen L. McKee, Comparing the Lowest Cost Index Funds, FORBEs (May 19, 2016, 9:18 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2016/05/19/comparing-the-lowest-cost-index-funds/
#67f70159299b.
166. Flood, supra note 163.
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to various protections under the federal securities laws, but they are precluded
from such protections by regulatory loopholes and ambiguities that will be fur-
ther discussed in Parts III.B and 11I.C below. One commentator estimated that
pension plans collectively lost $600 billion over an eight-year period by failing
to invest in passive investments.1 7 An additional commentator provided the
following summary of reports that further estimated exorbitant costs resulting
from hedge fund allocations by specific pension plans across the country:
A 2015 report by the New York City comptroller's office found that over ten years,
the city's five public pensions had paid more than $2 billion in fees to hedge funds
and received virtually nothing in return. According to data compiled by Bloomberg,
hedge funds earned 0.4 percent-basically nothing-in 2015, despite the exorbitant
fees they charged pensions to manage their money. A report by the Utah Legislative
Auditor General's office found that had Utah maintained its 2004 asset allocation
and not invested any money in hedge funds, it would have gained $1.35 billion
in additional assets by 2013.168
A study administered by the American Federation of Teachers further assessed
the impact of reducing alternative asset fees charged to twelve pension
plans."' The study found that cutting such fees in half would have saved
these pension plans approximately $3.8 billion on an annual basis.170
Many endowments have similarly been subject to comparable losses with re-
spect to underperforming hedge funds. For instance, the Penn State endowment
lost over $10 million dollars in a hedge fund investment gone awry, which was
compounded by the higher fees charged by such adviser.17 ' Another source
noted that several prominent endowments are paying a significant portion of
their assets to hedge fund advisers.172 This commentator further estimated
that, in 2014, "Yale paid about $480 million to private equity fund managers
as compensation-about $137 million in annual management fees, and another
$343 million in performance fees, also known as carried interest-to manage
about $8 billion, one-third of Yale's endowment." ' These potential misalloca-
tions of capital can adversely impact financial aid, scholarships, and other pro-
grams that countless students rely on across the country.
These misallocations can also perpetuate wealth inequality by creating oppor-
tunities for advisers to earn excessive fees that do not necessarily match their
skillsets in producing superior returns. The studies summarized in Part II.A
167. See Faust, supra note 12.
168. Tyler Bond, Are Hedge Funds Hurting Your Pension?, NAT'L PUB. PENSION COAL. (May 19, 2016),
https://protectpensions.org/2016/05/19/hedge-funds-hurting-pension/.
169. AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, THE BIG SQUEEZE: How MONEY MANAGERS' FEES CRUSH STATE BUDGETS AND
WORKERS' RETIREMENT HOPES 2 (2017), https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/bigsqueeze-may2017.pdf.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Rachael Levy, How Teachers, Firemen and College Endowments Ended Up Enriching America's
Hedge Fund Billionaires, Bus. INSIDER (July 7, 2017, 9:01 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
college-endowments-and-public-pensions-enrich-hedge-fund-billionaires-2017-6.
172. Victor Fleischer, Stop Universities from Hoarding Money, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 19, 2015), https:II
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/opinion/stop-universities-from-hoarding-money.html.
173. Id.
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above document the difficulties that hedge funds have encountered in producing
above-market returns, despite the higher fees charged for such allocations. In
fact, Simon Lack estimated that, "[f]rom 1998 to 2010, hedge fund managers
earned $379 billion in fees. The investors of their funds earned only $70 billion
in investing gains. Managers kept 84 percent of investment profits, while inves-
tors netted only 16 percent."'7 4 Hedge fund advisers have essentially accumu-
lated massive amounts of wealth through the collection of hedge fund fees
that far exceed the wealth generated for their underlying clients.
Hedge fund advisers are likewise amongst the highest income earners in the
country. Although it is difficult to parse out the specific industries that comprise
the top 1 percent of income earners, most people would agree that financial ser-
vices industries comprise a large portion of this figure.'" Such financial profes-
sionals can include financial advisers, investment bankers, and money managers,
such as hedge fund advisers.'76 One study noted that, "[f]inancial executives and
professionals account for an estimated 14 percent of the much-discussed top
1 percent of earners and over 18 percent of the top 0.1 percent."'7 7 In terms
of the hedge fund industry in particular, President Obama disclosed in an ad-
dress delivered at Georgetown University that, the top twenty-five hedge fund
managers earned more than all kindergarten teachers in 2012. Specifically, the
top twenty-five hedge fund managers earned $11.6 billion in 2014, while the
158,000 kindergarten teachers in the country made a collective $8.5 billion in
2012, which was the most current data available at that time.'78 Hedge fund ad-
visers can even earn more than corporate executives, as an additional source
noted that the top twenty-five hedge fund advisers "earned more than all the
CEOs of the S&P 500 combined.""'7  One scholar further found that the top
twenty-five hedge fund advisers at one point "represented roughly six percent
of the total income share of the 'ultra rich' top 0.01% of the US population-
the top 15,600 families that collectively had an income of about $372 billion." 8 0
174. Steve Denning, How Hedge Funds Transfer Wealth from Investors to Managers, FORBEs (May 28,
2013, 11:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/05/28/how-hedge-funds-
transfer-wealth-from-investors-to-managers/#7bc46ac218fc; see LACK, supra note 131, at 63; Barry
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bined, WASH. POST (May 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/05/12/
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In considering the large bulk of pension plans, endowments, and foundations
that are invested in this industry, hedge funds provide a troubling mechanism
for transferring the wealth from the bottom 90 percent of income earners to a
sizable fraction of the top .01 percent of income earners, who have largely failed
in earning superior returns for their underlying investors.
This troubling wealth transfer is compounded by the fact that performance
fees, also known as carried interest, receive favorable tax treatment under the In-
ternal Revenue Code.' Hedge fund advisers can treat carried interest payments
as capital gains, which are generally subject to a tax rate cap of only 20 per-
cent.18 2 Other categories of income are subject to a tax rate cap of 37 percent. 183
As a result, the collective taxes paid by advisers are not likely to offset these siz-
able wealth transfers retrieved from average investors.184
One would have likely assumed that the bulk of Fiduciary Investors would
flee the industry given the abundance of research questioning whether hedge
funds can earn above-market returns and the resulting harms discussed in the
preceding section. In 2014, the California Public Employees' Retirement System
began to divest its entire $4 billion hedge fund allocation due to excessive com-
plexity and costs.'8 A handful of pension plans followed suit, such as New York
City's Pension Fund, which pulled its $1.7 billion hedge fund allocation around
April 2016.186 Yet, following these notable departures from the industry, insti-
tutional investors, such as pension plans, endowments, and foundations, have
increased hedge fund allocations to record levels. The Texas County & District
Retirement System for example invested over 21 percent of its entire portfolio
in a range of hedge funds in 2017, amounting to $6.26 billion of the system's
$28.6 billion portfolio.' 8 7 Around 2014, the Arizona State Retirement System al-
located a total of 28 percent into such alternative investments.'88 As one source
noted, "[s]ince 2005, state and local pension plans have sharply increased their
exposure to alternative investments, including private equity, real estate, and
181. Matthew Gardner, Mnuchin's Not So Grand Stand on the Carried Interest Loophole Explained,
INST. TAX'N & EcON. POL'Y (Feb. 15, 2018), https://itep.org/mnuchins-not-so-grand-stand-on-the-
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186. See Ram, supra note 185.
187. Nico Grant, Texas Pension Bets Bigger on Hedge Funds as Others Back Away, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
22, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-21/texas-pension-bets-
bigger-on-hedge-funds-as-others-back-away; see also CaISTRS, Harvard join Ranks of Giant Allocators,
HEDGE FUND ALERT (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.hfalert.com/documents/FG/hsp/hfa-rankings/
591124_Institutionallnvestors.pdf.
188. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 13, at 4.
Dissecting the Hedge Fund Conundrum 763
hedge funds, from 9% of portfolios, on average, to 24%."'' An additional
source further estimated that, "[m]ore than half of the $3 trillion held in
hedge funds nationwide is pension fund and retirement plan investments."190
With respect to other categories of Fiduciary Investors, a survey administered
by Preqin in 2018 found that "[e]ighty-three percent of endowments and 66%
of foundations invest[ed] in hedge funds . .. [and that e]ndowments and foun-
dations both have average allocations to hedge funds of 19%."9
D. IRRATIONAL ALLOCATIONS ENABLED BY HEDGE FUND OPACITY
As discussed in previous sections, investing in hedge funds is not necessarily
an irrational decision from an economic standpoint. Given their private status,
hedge fund advisers can access an entire universe of financial instruments and
strategies that are simply inaccessible to registered mutual funds. Accessing
such strategies can greatly assist Fiduciary Investors in diversifying their under-
lying portfolios while targeting alternative investments that do not directly cor-
relate with equity markets. Examples of common hedge fund strategies include
market neutral, global macro, opportunistic, emerging markets, and distressed
securities, among several others.192 Hedge funds also tend to perform better dur-
ing volatile and declining markets, which are an inevitable component of the nat-
ural business cycle. Fiduciary Investors might be increasing allocations to hedge
funds to protect against the declining markets that will soon occur.
But given the pervasive evidence of subpar returns and excessive fees that have
saturated the industry over the past decade, one can easily infer that large num-
bers of Fiduciary Investors have made economically irrational decisions to con-
tinuously increase allocations over this particular period. The troubling evidence
of hidden hedge fund fees briefly revealed in Part II.B above further demon-
strates the puzzling difficulties that Fiduciary Investors have faced in optimizing
hedge fund investments on behalf of their retail investor constituents. As will be
further discussed below, Fiduciary Investors often confront unique incentives to
make "irrational" hedge fund allocations, such as the pressure to produce above
average returns in the face of staggering funding deficits, and the ambiguities re-
lated to pension plan trustees complying with elusive fiduciary duties that typ-
ically apply under state law. Economically irrational decisions to invest in hedge
funds are further enabled by the opacity of the industry as the details surround-
ing these decisions are obscured from the public eye.
For instance, pension plans face significant pressure to chase alpha given the
staggering funding deficits facing local and state pension plans across the nation,
189. Ryan Derousseau, Retirement: Your Pension Plan Has a Big Hedge Fund Problem, FORTUNE
(July 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/28/retirement-pensions-hedge-funds/.
190. Ritholtz, supra note 114 (quoting Leland Faust, CSI Capital Management); see also PREQIN,
SPECIAL REPORT: HEDGE FUNDS IN THE US 3 (July 2018), http://docs.preqin.com/reports/Preqin-
Special-Report-Hedge-Funds-in-the-US-July-2018.pdf (charting categories of investors in hedge
funds).
191. Preqin, supra note 115.
192. See Friedland, supra note 89.
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which deficits total $1.4 trillion according to certain estimates.'9 3 In 2016, New
Jersey's pension plan faced a deficit of $168.3 billion, while the pension plan in
Illinois faced a deficit of $141.2 billion.1 9 4 Pension plan trustees ("Trustees")
have attempted and/or undergone drastic measures to close those shortfalls,
such as cutting benefits, reducing funding for schools, and linking pay to perfor-
mance. 195 Other political leaders have pushed for new government employees to
enroll in 401(k) plans as opposed to paying into a government-sponsored pen-
sion plan that is guaranteed upon retirement.
In the midst of the political warfare centered around these changes, many
Trustees view alternative investments as a more politically feasible solution
due to their proprietary nature. Trustee decisions to allocate to hedge funds
are not easily scrutinized by policymakers or beneficiaries as disclosure of de-
tailed information regarding strategies and fees is limited. '9 6 Hedge funds
have admittedly demonstrated potential opportunities to produce alpha. Because
hedge funds can access exotic and innovative trading strategies that are largely
inaccessible to mutual funds, Trustees likely view these entities as an alluring op-
portunity to easily close the pension plan funding gaps that have tanked state
and municipal budgets across the country. Many hedge funds also perform bet-
ter during declining markets given their abilities to engage in protective strategies
by utilizing short-trading, credit default swaps, and other derivative instruments.
Countless commentators and researchers predict that our current bull market,
which has surprisingly lasted close to a decade, will come to an end in the
near future.
But then again, the research on whether hedge funds can earn superior returns
in such markets is divided as was discussed at length in Part II.A above. While
some scholars have found that hedge funds have earned absolute returns during
historic bear markets during the 1990s and 2000s, others have found that, over
these same time periods, investors would have been better off investing in trea-
193. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE PENSION FUNDING GAP: 2016 2 (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/04/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2016.
194. Laurie Meisler, Pension Fund Problems Worsen in 43 States, BLOOMBERG, https://www.
bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-state-pension-funding-ratios/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2017).
195. Elise Young, Christie Panel Says Only Benefit Cuts Can Fix NJ. Pensions, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6,
2017, 10:16 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-06/n-j-worker-benefit-cuts-
seen-by-group-as-only-fix-for-pensions.
196. See, e.g., Paul Rose & Jason S. Seligman, Alternative Investments? State & Local Pension Port-
folio Use and Performance 6 (Mar. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2407538 ("Plan officials may herd with respect to alternative investments because, as a general matter,
alternative investments provide a means for funds to limit information about performance; alternative
investments are not as capable of being marked-to-market as are publicly-traded investments. Alterna-
tive investments tend to suppress information about performance and thus may provide a means of
suppressing measured volatility. This possibility presents two layers of potentially problematic agency
costs. First, alternative investments may be prone to higher agency costs as the general partner manag-
ers of such investments may provide little information on asset values to their limited partners.... Sec-
ond, pension fund officials may themselves have an incentive to provide little information on asset val-
ues and performance to their beneficiaries. The limited information on alternative asset performance
may thus serve funds as a further source of criticism insurance by damping the frequency and precision
of mark-to-market measures.").
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sury bills. Additional research has emerged that further correlates hedge fund
performance with equities and bonds. According to one such study, "[w]hereas
hedge fund managers promise uncorrelated returns and downside protection, all
of the 11 pension funds reviewed demonstrated significant correlation between
hedge fund and total fund performance," which presumably includes a large
share of stocks and bonds.' Analyses of this nature are further complicated
by the fact that some hedge funds employ strategies that are dynamic, or that
are comparable to mutual funds, even after charging higher fees. Assessing
fees is also problematic given the pervasive reports of Trustees having to pay bil-
lions of dollars to hedge funds in hidden and unanticipated fees, which further
gouge into the anticipated returns of such pension plans. Researchers have for-
tunately utilized sophisticated research strategies to make observations about the
hedge fund industry in broad strokes. Nevertheless, accessing particularized in-
formation about a single hedge fund allocation is difficult to do if you are not in
contractual privity as a direct investor or accessing discovery as a litigant in pro-
ceedings against a hedge fund. Information asymmetries of this nature could be
partially addressed through a disclosure framework for hedge-fund-like strategies,
which will be further discussed in Part IV below. Creating such an opportunity to
allocate to transparent hedge-fund-like strategies could similarly assist Trustees in
selecting optimal wealth-maximization investments during declining markets.
The proprietary nature of hedge funds similarly makes it less likely that Trust-
ees will be found liable for breaching their already elusive fiduciary duties in de-
ciding to allocate to these private vehicles. As background, these duties generally
obligate Trustees to act for the exclusive benefit of plan beneficiaries in managing
plan assets.' Because public pension plans are exempt from the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and subject to varying degrees
of regulation under their respective states, they must consult several sources in
determining the precise contours of these duties. 199 Trustees must consistently
evaluate state constitutions and statutes, common law, and plan documents.2 0 0
Even still, states often replicate various provisions of ERISA, including provisions
codifying the omnipresent duty of prudence.2 0 1 Under this duty, states often
adopt the standard provided under section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, which obli-
gates fiduciaries to manage the plan "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like ca-
pacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
197. ELIZABETH PARISIAN & SAQIB BHATTI, ALL THAT GLITTERS Is NOT GOLD: AN ANALYSIS OF US PUBLIC
PENSION INVESTMENTS IN HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2015), https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/
allthatglittersisnotgold20l5.pdf.
198. David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor's Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2122 (2014).
199. Id. at 2120-21 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1); EMP. BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, PART FIVE: PUBLIC SECTOR 20 (2005)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2120 (noting that many states have copied ERISA's fiduciary duties); id. at 2122 (citing
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (imposing duty of prudence)); id. at 2152-57 (analyzing duty of
prudence).
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of a like character and with like aims."202 In broad strokes, this duty of prudence
essentially requires that Trustees utilize reasonable expertise and diligence in se-
lecting investment allocations for pension plan portfolios.2 03 It additionally re-
quires that prospective investments "be examined for appropriate factors such
as the risk of loss, the opportunity for return, diversification, liquidity, current
return and projected return."204 Complying with these fiduciary duties is a com-
plicated endeavor that often yields inconsistent results. Investing in markets with
limited transparency further muddies the waters in terms of determining
whether there has been a breach by Trustees in deciding to invest in hedge
funds.
Assessing current and projected returns of hedge funds, for instance, can pres-
ent conflicting conclusions. As explored in detail in Part IIA, the current returns
of the industry have been dismal given the pervasive evidence that hedge funds
have collectively been unable to beat the markets over the past decade or so. Yet,
assessing projected returns may paint a more positive picture as hedge funds can
leverage liberal investment freedoms to outperform declining markets. The re-
search is somewhat split on this issue as discussed at the beginning of this sub-
section. One can easily imagine a scenario where Trustees justify a hedge fund
allocation that is yielding negative returns on the basis that it will yield positive
returns in the future, based on precarious promises made by hedge fund advis-
ers. The opacity of the industry obscures the extent to which simultaneously
evaluating current and future returns can be thoroughly examined.
With respect to diversity, incorporating hedge funds into a pension plan's
portfolio seems essential, in spite of its noted transparency deficiencies, as the
industry is comprised of an entire universe of distinctive strategies that are sim-
ply unavailable in the mutual fund space. Hedge funds have become a prominent
player in the global marketplace and simply dismissing the entire industry, with-
out providing a meaningful justification, seems imprudent on its face. Moreover,
if the vast majority of pension plans are allocating to this industry, refusing to do
so can be viewed as suspicious. It is presumably an easier strategy to simply "fol-
low the herd" in complying with these seemingly elusive fiduciary duties.2 0 5 On
the other hand, following the crowd is problematic if there is clear evidence that
an industry is facing significant challenges in producing long-term returns. Sev-
eral Trustees have indeed made the difficult decision to divest from the hedge
202. Id. at 2152 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)).
203. See Jose M. Jara, ERISA Fiduciary Considerations When Incorporating Alternative Investments in
Your Pension Plan's Portfolio, CARDOZO LAw 3, https://cardozo.yu.edu/erisa-fiduciary-considerations-
when-incorporating-alternative-investments-your-pension-plans (la t visited Mar. 19, 2019).
204. Id.
205. See Rose & Seligman, supra note 196, at 6 ("Even though plan officials are relatively well-
protected from personal liability for investment decisions, they still may follow other states' leads
in alternative investments because doing so is a form of 'criticism insurance' against claims made
by various constituencies, including plan beneficiaries and state legislators. Additionally, plan trust-
ees and managers often hire expert consultants, who are likely to provide common investment strate-
gies to plan officials. In both of these respects, plan officials may defensibly claim to have relied on
the prevailing wisdom on plan investment-in other words, they completed due diligence and in-
vested prudently under the circumstances and given available information.").
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fund industry and many pension plans are facing growing pressures from ben-
eficiaries and other industry groups to follow suit.
In terms of assessing liquidity, alternative investments present similar compli-
cations. Many alternative investment options are less liquid than equities and
bonds because those instruments are not as heavily traded and/or encompass
long-term investments. However, pension plans have more latitude to invest
in illiquid investment schemes as its underlying assets are not typically redeem-
able by beneficiaries until retirement. Challenges still arise with respect to the
often opaque and inconsistent valuations of such illiquid instruments. Trustees
may have limited expertise in assessing the value of exotic strategies. Retaining
the requisite expertise to sufficiently do so can be prohibitively expensive. Mak-
ing inaccurate predictions in this regard can cost beneficiaries billions of dollars
in the long run, thereby widening the already increasing funding deficit tanking
pension plans across the nation.
Some commentators have implicated Trustees for engaging in conflict of inter-
est transactions by taking kickbacks from advisers in exchange for significant al-
locations to their hedge fund(s). Such kickbacks can include campaign contribu-
tions and board seats to members of a pension board at additional companies as
well as future business dealings. A study summarized by the Institutional Investor
found that:
[Tihe more members of a pension's board that are affiliated with a third-party service
provider-including fund administrators, investment consultants, insurers, custodi-
ans and asset managers-the more likely they are to hire that firm. . . . [Alffiliations
could include a director hiring a fund manager they already know, or directors ap-
pointing fund managers in exchange for board seats at other organizations.206
Litigation also ensued after the New Mexico State Investment Council alleged
that political insiders steered state investment money into hedge funds in ex-
change for receiving 25 percent of the fees received by such advisers.2 0 7 Accord-
ing to the Albuquerque Journal, "[t]hose payments were disguised by a fee-sharing
deal through a Chicago-based broker-dealer that passed 90 percent of the fees it
received from [the adviser] to [the political insiders]."208 Conflicts of interests of
this nature can cause further declines in the overall portfolios of pension plans
that get passed down to beneficiaries upon retirement.
To the extent such a conflict occurs, or other allegations of mismanagement, it
can be very difficult for beneficiaries to bring such litigation due to the road-
blocks potential plaintiffs face in proving standing. In order to demonstrate
206. Alicia McElhaney, Board Conflicts of Interest Pose Threat to Pension Fund Returns, INSTITUTIONAL
INV'R (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/bl73s0r46531dy/board-
conflicts-of-interest-pose-threat-to-pension-fund-returns.
207. Robert A. Cronkleton & Ian Cummings, New Mexico Sues Chiefs Owner Clark Hunt, Alleging
Kickbacks in $300 Million Investment, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 3, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.
kansascity.com/sports/nfl/kansas-city-chiefs/article l71107222.html.
208. Id. (citing Mike Gallagher, SIC Sues Kansas City Chiefs Owner in Pay-to-Play Scandal, ALBUQUER-
QuE J. (Sept. 1, 2017, 11:45 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1057513/sic-sues-kansas-city-chiefs-
owner-in-paytoplay-scandal.html).
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standing, courts often find that individuals must have suffered a substantial loss
to retirement benefits actually received from their Trustee.2 09 While these stand-
ing issues are largely outside the scope of this article, these difficulties are wors-
ened by the limited transparency of hedge funds. Necessary information regard-
ing Trustee relationships as well as cost structures and returns of comparable
hedge funds are largely undisclosed to the general public. Even if they are vol-
untarily disclosed, they are reported in an unstandardized format making it dif-
ficult to make comparisons across a range of hedge funds. Such disclosures
would have to be mandated through registration under the federal securities
laws.
III. How DID WE GET HERE? AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY LENS
Generally speaking, economically irrational hedge fund allocations seem to be
enabled by the opacity of the industry. Trustees can effectively mask conflicts of
interest or larger problems of underfunded plans by continuing to allocate to an
industry that has failed to earn sufficient returns. Retail investors are thus ex-
posed to an opaque and potentially harmful market even though federal securi-
ties laws are supposed to entitle such investors to an array of investor protection
guarantees. Theories of institutional change, such as "conversion" and "drift,"
provide a novel and historical lens for assessing how lawmakers may have facil-
itated this regulatory loophole commonly referred to as "retailization" over ex-
tended periods of time. Part 11.A thus commences with an in-depth description
of the primary tenets of these two theoretical constructs, while explaining how
they are distinctive from other more dominant theories of institutional change,
such as rational choice institutionalism. Parts 111.B and 11I.C then delve into
the deeper theoretical analysis as to how lawmakers initially converted notions
of publicness through "conversion" to allow retail investor exposure to private
entities under certain circumstances. Part 111.D underscores how these new def-
initions of publicness remained intact, despite increasing evidence of their inef-
fectiveness, thus generating "drift" within this succinct area of the law. All the
while, traditional conceptions of investor protection have remained as an invari-
able component of federal securities laws irrespective of these hidden changes
which have left many retail investors unduly exposed.
A. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM, CONVERSION, AND DRIFT
Political and social scientists have long studied the multidimensional factors
that influence the extent to which institutions, such as formal laws and regula-
tions, evolve over time and influence human interactions. Various schools have
emerged from this broader theoretical construct, such as sociological, political,
and rational choice institutionalism.2 10 With respect to rational institutionalists,
209. Jacklyn Wille, DOL Continues Uphill Battle on Pension Plan Standing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21,
2016), https://www.bna.com/dol-continues-uphill-n57982078962/.
210. See Amenta & Ramsey, supra note 16, at 15-16; Beland, supra note 28, at 21-24.
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they essentially believe that human beings are rational actors who engage in a
series of cost-benefit analyses on an individual level in determining whether
to take a particular course of action.2 1 1 Institutions are therefore relevant in
terms of how they influence strategic decisions on the part of human actors,
such as lawmakers, interest group representatives, and other participants, in
the development of institutional frameworks.2 1 2 Public choice theorists similarly
assert that lawmakers are entrenched by personal economic interests in deciding
whether to pursue a particular legislative and/or regulatory course of action.2 1 3
As such, regulatory capture often results from bureaucrats passing rules that
benefit private interest groups to the detriment of the general populace with
the hopes of creating future lucrative mployment opportunities within such pri-
vate industries.2 1 4
Historical institutionalism is yet an additional paradigm within this theoretical
realm that relies on historical analysis to "trace the processes behind the creation
and persistence of institutions and policies."2 15 It is further rooted in the notion
"that a historically constructed set of institutional constraints and opportunities
affects the behavior of political actors and interest groups involved in the policy
process."2 16 Historical institutionalists effectively provide a "big-picture" over-
view of particular contexts or processes that transpire over time with respect
to particular institutions.2 17 These sorts of identified patterns may go largely un-
noticed under other modes of analysis which may focus on the particular events
surrounding the succinct institutional changes identified in the underlying
study.2 18 Moreover, historical institutionalists do not necessarily assume that
human actors are naturally rule-abiding citizens on one end of the spectrum,
or act in a completely self-interested manner on the opposing end of this
same spectrum. But rather, such theorists emphasize the importance of history
in identifying the appropriate context in which decisions occur over time, and
that expectations with respect to such decisions are in part molded by these
past experiences.2 1 9
Professor Thelen further developed a subset of this theory which is commonly
referred to as "conversion. "220 Conversion generally occurs when political actors
reinterpret ambiguous rules and redirect them toward new purposes.2 2 1 Such
211. Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44
POL. STUD. 936, 944-45 (1996).
212. Id. at 941, 946.
213. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Why Weren't the Airlines Regulated?, 23 YALEJ. ON REG. 269, 270-
71 (2006); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScL. 3, 3-4
(1971).
214. See Ernesto Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REv. ECON. POLY 203 (2006).
215. Amenta & Ramsey, supra note 16, at 16.
216. Beland, supra note 28, at 21.
217. See Amenta & Ramsey, supra note 16, at 23.
218. See id. at 25.
219. Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism, in APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES IN THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES 118, 126 (Donatella della Porta & Michael Keating eds., 2008).
220. See Thelen, supra note 17, at 225-26.
221. Id.
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new purposes primarily include policies that extend beyond the original intent of
the legislation in question.2 2 2 Conversion is more apt to occur when the under-
lying legislation is ambiguous in nature, thus enabling the courts and/or
bureaucratic administrative agencies to provide future interpretations that con-
flict with the law's original purpose.2 23 Lawmakers are therefore empowered
to exploit this ambiguity, perhaps at the urging of private interest groups, with-
out having to initiate controversial amendments to the effectuating legislation.
For instance, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was originally intended to pre-
vent corporations from engaging in collusions and cartels.2 24 Yet, affected corpo-
rations were able to utilize the courts to "redirect [this] legislation in their battles
against trade unions whose organizing efforts were then similarly found to be 'in
restraint of trade."'225 Parts III.B and III.C below will similarly assess the extent
to which lawmakers converted notions of publicness under federal securities
laws during two phases of regulatory and legislative enactments that occurred
in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively.
Professor Hacker identified "drift" as an additional process through which the
impact of a particular institutional framework weakens over time due to eco-
nomic shifts or other societal changes. In broad strokes, drift refers to "systema-
tic, prolonged failures of government to respond to the shifting realities of a dy-
namic economy."226 More specifically, "[d]rift occurs when institutions or
policies are deliberately held in place while their context shifts in ways that
alter their effects."227 Professor Hacker notably used this concept to explain
how the law has perpetuated the severe wealth disparities between the wealthy
and the disappearing middle class in this country.2 28 For example, drift can be
used to examine the government's failure to update the minimum wage laws to
reflect economic changes in inflation rates.2 29 Special interest groups successfully
lobbied against substantial efforts to update these applicable laws. Part III.D below
will similarly investigate the extent to which lawmakers have failed to update
amended definitions of publicness in the face of increasing harms experienced
by retail investor exposure to private investment funds.
Professors Hacker, Thelen, and Paul Pierson from the University of California
at Berkeley have further explored the shared characteristics between conversion
and drift in their often-cited piece, Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces of Institu-
tional Change.2 3 0 Their collaboration reveals how drift and conversion both en-
able significant and often "hidden" changes in political outcomes even when
their underlying institutions remain intact and relatively stable. These changes
also occur during periods of stability, as opposed to being enacted in response
222. See Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 185.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 180-81.
225. Id. at 181 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).
226. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 22, at 43.
227. Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 180.
228. See generally HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 22, passim.
229. See Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 202.
230. See id. at 180-208.
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to an exogenous shock or event that often triggers large-scale legislative amend-
ments.2 3 1 Organized interest groups have a distinct advantage over general vot-
ers in relying on these inconspicuous strategies. These groups deploy their ample
resources in becoming "repeat players" to effectuate these sorts of strategic
changes over extended periods of time. 2 3 2 The theoretical underpinnings of
drift and conversion counter a strand of scholarship that concludes that most
meaningful financial legislation is passed in response to a financial crisis or mas-
sive fraud. According to the authors, many institutional changes occur without
extensive scrutiny from the general populace, thus reflecting the limited
power of voters in certain contexts.2 3 3
B. STAGE 1: CONVERSION OF PUBLICNESS THROUGH ADOPTION OF
REGULATION D
Protecting investors from the ubiquitous abuses that led to the Great Depres-
sion was the primary goal of Congress in adopting the federal securities laws. In
effectuating this goal, Congress incorporated the views implicit in a well-known
quote by Louis D. Brandeis. He famously stated that "Is]unlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."234 Broadcasting
information to large audiences can serve to uncover malfeasance and bad beha-
vior. Mandating the disclosure of such information can also be an effective tool
in preemptively deterring private actors from engaging in fraudulent conduct. In
a similar vein, infusing the markets with information was the mechanism
through which the federal securities laws sought to protect investors. In a written
message delivered to Congress, President Roosevelt stated that: "There is, how-
ever, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold
in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information,
and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed
from the buying public."235 Representative Sam Rayburn echoed those concerns
regarding informational disparity: "We have, on the one hand, 18,000,000 pas-
sive citizens having no actual contact with their companies; on the other hand, a
few hundred powerful managers directing and controlling the destinies of the
companies and the physical properties which they own."236 Through the passage
of the federal securities laws, retail investors are thus protected by a mandatory
disclosure framework for public offerings.
These inaugural laws also included a series of exemptions, as it would be un-
feasible to subject the entire universe of companies within the United States to
231. See id. at 181.
232. See id. at 198-203.
233. See id. at 190-91.
234. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick A. Stokes
Co. 1914).
235. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (written statement of Pres. Roosevelt on the Regulation of Security
Issues presented to the Senate on Mar. 29, 1933).
236. 77 CONG. REc. 2918 (1933) (statement of Rep. Rayburn regarding H.R. 5480 on May 5,
1933).
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regulation of this magnitude. As such, the federal securities laws are largely in-
tended to cover only public offerings and companies. The definition of public-
ness however springs from a vague and ambiguous provision provided under
the Securities Act, which presents fertile ground for conversion to occur within
this niche area of the law.237 As reiterated in the preceding section, conversion is
more likely to transpire when provisions are ambiguous, making it easier for
political actors to direct them to new purposes. Moreover, because publicness
is defined haphazardly through exemptions (which will be further discussed
below), it is significantly easier from a strategic standpoint for political actors
to facilitate changes, without altering the original effectuating legislation.
Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts from certain disclosure require-
ments "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."2 3 8 The term
"public" is not defined under the law, and the Securities Act's legislative history
fails to illuminate Congress's intent in important regards. In adopting this pro-
vision, Congress simply documented that the law is not intended to regulate of-
ferings "where the public benefits are too remote."23 9 Countless interpretations
arise from this vague description of publicness. It could encompass activities
that have an adverse impact on the general public in some capacity, offerings
that are open to large numbers of investors across numerous geographical
areas, or offerings that raise a high amount of capital in total proceeds. This
lack of clarity likely resulted from the rushed process through which this legis-
lation was passed.2 4 0 Roosevelt sought to quickly capitalize on the strong polit-
ical support that resulted from the Great Depression.2 4 1
Due to the ambiguity of this provision, the SEC was then empowered to pro-
vide additional guidance in outlining the contours of a public offering. In 1935,
the SEC published an interpretive release which instructed issuers to evaluate the
following factors in determining whether an offering was public or private:
"(1) [t]he number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the is-
suer . . . (2) [t]he number of units offered . . . (3) [t]he size of the offering ...
land] (4) [t]he manner of offering."242 While the first factor (at least in part)
seems to reference the access that offerees have to information regarding the
issuer, the second and third factors seem to address the overall impact of the
offering by referring to the number of units offered and its size. The fourth
and final factor alludes to the ways in which the offering was advertised to pro-
spective investors. A broad marketing campaign to a large number of offerees
across multiple states likely entails a public offering in evaluating these factors.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018).
238. Id.
239. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (setting forth recommendation of the Comm. on Interstate
& Foreign Com. regarding H.R. 5480).
240. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 52 (3d ed. 2003) ("fPresident] Roosevelt
was determined to draft and quickly submit to Congress a securities bill that could be voted on while
he still enjoyed the extraordinary political support generated by the bank crisis.").
241. Id.
242. Letter of General Counsel, 11 Fed. Reg. 10952 (Sept. 27, 1946) (setting forth opinion dated
Jan. 24, 1935).
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However, in 1953, the Supreme Court famously emphasized the importance
of focusing on the status of offerees in determining whether an offering was in-
deed public.2 4 3 In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the Supreme Court held that an of-
fering to those who can "fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any
public offering." 2 4 4 The Court effectively reasoned that, if offerees have access to
the same type of information that would be available in a registration statement,
then they do not need the protections guaranteed under the federal securities
laws. 2 4 5 Executive employees of the issuer could appropriately fend for them-
selves given their direct access to material information related to the issuer.2 4 6
The Court further implied that he size of the offering, in terms of its total offer-
ees, size, and units, is not as relevant in determining whether it is considered
public.2 4 7 An offering to a single offeree who is unable to fend for himself
could constitute a public offering under the Court's approach. Conversely, an
offering to thousands of investors, who could each fend for herself, could still
be considered a private offering, and thus exempt from certain disclosure re-
quirements. Following this decision, it was clear that evaluating the status of of-
ferees was the primary determinant of whether an offering would be deemed
public.
The 1980s ushered in a new era of political ideology that was largely driven by
proponents of free markets and individualism. These advocates shunned the
New Deal approach of government regulation over a wide range of private actors
and instead opted for a deregulatory agenda which "recaptured political and in-
tellectual influence in America, England, and within a decade, most of the first-
world countries."2 4 8 This shift in political ideology precipitated new changes to
the definition of publicness and further nourished the terrain for conversion to
transpire and alter the definition of publicness. A triggering factor of conversion
is referred to as "actor discontinuity" where political "actors not involved in (in
some cases not even around for) those rules' creation seek to redirect them to-
ward new ends."249 The administration led by President Ronald Reagan played
a major role in influencing the deregulatory approach that unfolded into various
areas of the law, including the definition of publicness under federal securities
laws. As one author noted, "[t]his state of experimentation reflected the transi-
tion from the activist, regulatory-minded SEC of the 1970s to the more deregu-
latory SEC of the 1980s. . . . The SEC was given an additional push in the early
1980s by . . . the deregulatory force of the new Reagan administration."2 5 0
243. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953).
244. Id. at 125 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2)).
245. Id. at 125-26.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 125.
248. CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINEss ASSOCIATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 5-6 (6th ed. 2010).
249. Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 184.
250. Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regula-
tory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 237-38 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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As such, in 1982, the SEC promulgated Regulation D, which is a safe harbor
that made it even easier for issuers to structure private placement offerings.2 5 1
Among the rules included within this regulation are Rules 504 and 506.252
Rule 504 imposes restrictions on the amount that may be raised and on how
the offering may be advertised; Rule 506 does not limit the amount that may
be raised, but does impose restrictions on the number and status of purchasers
and on how the offering may be advertised.2 53 With respect to the status of pur-
chasers, Regulation D coined a new term, "accredited investor," which provides a
more bright line and expansive definition of purchasers who can adequately fend
for themselves.2 5 4 Individuals who earn over $200,000 per year, as well as a va-
riety of institutions, are included in this definition.2 55 But more importantly, this
new definition of accredited investor added pension plans, endowments, and
other institutional investors that serve underlying retail investor beneficiaries.2 5 6
This exclusion fostered the final stage of conversion in this era where Regulation
D converted original notions of publicness under the Securities Act to exclude
large groups of retail investors from its investor protection guarantees. Moreover,
under Rule 506, if issuers restrict offerings to accredited investors (among other
requirements), they can raise an unlimited amount of capital. These changes pre-
cipitated massive growth in a wide breadth of private industries, which rival in
size and breadth to public companies, thus contributing to the harms discussed
herein with respect to retail investor exposure to private hedge funds.
C. STAGE 2: FURTHER CONVERSION OF PUBLICNESS THROUGH
PASSAGE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS IMPROVEMENTS
ACT OF 1996
Publicness is further defined through a series of exemptions provided under
the 1940 Act, which creates additional layers of regulation for pooled investment
vehicles. Private Funds have historically relied on section 3(c)(1) of the 1940 Act
to avoid its registration requirements by restricting the number of fund investors
to one hundred beneficial owners.2 5 7 Funds that rely on section 3(c)(1) must si-
multaneously restrict offerings to accredited investors, and are likewise restricted
251. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-508 (2019).
252. Id. §§ 230.504, 230.506. In 2016, the SEC removed and reserved Rule 505. Exemptions to
Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg. 83494, 83553 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, 240, 249, 270 & 275).
253. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.506 (2019).
254. Id. § 230.501(a).
255. Id. The SEC may however lower the accredited investor standard in the near future as,
"Chairman Clayton tannounced] that the SEC plans to issue a white paper and seek public comment
on how best to revamp the capital-raising process. According to Clayton, this could include liberal-
izing the 'accredited investor' standard that currently locks millions of middle-class Americans out of
some of the most lucrative investment opportunities." Daniel Press, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Seeks to Liberalize 'Accredited Investor' Standard, COMPEITIVE ENrER. INST. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://
cei.org/blog/securities-and-exchange-commission-seeks-liberalize-accredited-investor-standard.
256. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2019).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2018).
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from "propos[ing] to make a public offering of its securities."2 58 This primary
emphasis on number of investors in defining the contours of publicness reflects
the commonly held notion that smaller pools are less likely to have an adverse
spillover effect on the general public. This belief was reflected in the following
language retrieved from congressional hearings on the passage of the 1940 Act:
A family may have a substantial estate and has invested its money in marketable se-
curities. In essence that is a private investment company, is it not? We do not want
any part of it; and so we have said that even though you engage in the same type of
activity as an investment company, which is within the purview of this section, if
you have less than 100 security holders you are not a public investment company
and not within the purview of this legislation.25
In summary, a fund restricting its beneficial owners to less than one hundred
security holders would have been considered private irrespective of its underly-
ing activities.2 60
The 1990s however was characterized by yet an additional period of deregu-
latory initiatives that served to further convert notions of publicness under the
1940 Act. Economic growth initially fueled the mounting popularity of these ide-
ologies. Moreover, such ideologies were carried out by a Republican-controlled
House that prioritized deregulation of business, even with President Clinton de-
feating his Republican opponent in 1996.261 In assessing the impact to the 1940
Act, President Clinton signed into law the National Securities Markets Improve-
ment Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"), which sought "to amend the [1940 Act] to pro-
mote more efficient management of mutual funds, protect investors, and provide
more effective and less burdensome regulation."262 A new section 3(c)(7) ex-
emption was adopted under NSMIA where funds that restrict offerings to "qual-
ified purchasers" are considered private.2 63 Qualified purchasers are similar to
accredited investors, but they are subject to higher net-worth requirements.2 64
They include any institution (or natural person) that owns not less than
$5,000,000 in investments.2 6 5 Qualified purchasers of course include large
numbers of pension plans and other institutional investors with retail investor
exposure. If a fund restricts the status of its purchasers in this manner, then
the fund could raise an unlimited amount of capital from an unlimited number
of qualified purchasers without having to register under the 1940 Act. 2 66
258. Id.
259. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 179 (1940) (quoting David Schenker, Chief Counsel,
Inv. Tr. Study, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
260. PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 55, at 105.
261. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 184-85.
262. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3416 (1996) (quoting introductory language of the
NSMIA).
263. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2018).
264. Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i).
265. Id.
266. In order to simultaneously maintain exemptions under the Exchange Act, a hedge fund must
also restrict its number of investors to less than 2,000. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2018).
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These revisions resulted in the conversion of initial notions of publicness
within the investment fund industry, which originally emphasized smaller
pools and investor protection guarantees to retail investors. Despite the clear in-
vestor protection violations that could arise from this massive loophole, the
SEC's Division of Investment Management supported the adoption of such an
exemption. In 1992, "the Division recommend[ed] an amendment to the
[1940] Act to create a new exception for funds whose securities are held exclu-
sively by 'qualified purchasers' . . . premised on the theory that 'qualified pur-
chasers' do not need the Act's protections because they are able to monitor
such matters as management fees, transactions with affiliates, corporate gover-
nance, and leverage."267 This statement served to reinforce traditional notions
of investor protection that are deeply embedded within the law, even though
such an exemption would simultaneously strip away such guarantees for certain
investors. One could assume that institutional investors would effectively pass
along their resources and sophistication to underlying retail investors by select-
ing sound investments on their behalf. But Part II above summarizes the exten-
sive evidence that proves that many such institutional investors are ill-equipped
to perform this task. This seems to be a classic case of conversion where funda-
mental legislation and/or policy remains intact despite massive "hidden" amend-
ments that may occur through bureaucratic layers of regulation that go unno-
ticed by the general populace.
D. STAGE 3: LAWMAKERs FAIL TO UPDATE AMENDED DEFINITIONS OF
PUBLICNESS RESULTING IN DRIFT
Converting the definition of publicness as discussed in the foregoing sections
was followed by a period of "drift," where lawmakers failed to update the
amended definitions to resolve the increasing retail investor exposure to hedge
funds. As stated by Professor Hacker, drift refers to "changes in the operation
or effect of policies that occur without significant changes in those policies'
structure."2 68 He further explains that drift extends beyond a simple case of po-
litical inaction and requires that:
(1) the circumstances around policies or institutions change in ways that alter the
effects of those policies or institutions on the ground, (2) this change in outcomes
is recognized, (3) there are alternative rules that would reduce the degree to which
these shifts in outcomes occur (in other words, that the shifts are potentially reme-
diable), and (4) efforts to update these rules are not undertaken or are blocked.269
External shifts such as inflation, technological change, or financial innovation
frequently trigger drift as lawmakers encounter a range of roadblocks in re-
sponding to such changes.2 70
267. PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 55, at 104-05.
268. Hacker, supra note 21, at 246.
269. Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 184.
270. Id. at 193-95.
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In assessing this first condition, according to at least one commentator, the
adoption of section 3(c)(7) facilitated rapid growth in the hedge fund industry
so that, "[b]y 2000, the . . . industry had grown to manage $491 billion,
more than 10 times the amount from a decade earlier, according to HFR
data."2 7 ' Hedge fund growth alone is not problematic if it was solely fueled
by wealthy individuals or institutions that could bear the full risk of any losses
associated with such private investments. Fiduciary Investors, however, were the
primary drivers of this growth. Moreover, as discussed at length in Part II, Fidu-
ciary Investors have encountered significant difficulties in selecting optimal
hedge fund allocations. Trustees seemly rely on the opacity of the industry to
mask larger problems of underfunded pools fueled in part by poor investment
decisions and a growing number of retirees. Negotiating for lower fees via con-
tract has not resulted in a sufficient decline in collective fees charged by the in-
dustry given the uneven bargaining power held by Fiduciary Investors. Many
such institutions may simply lack the expertise to properly assess hedge funds
given the complexities of the industry's trading strategies, as well as its unstan-
dardized mechanisms for reporting fees and performance.
With respect to determining whether this change in outcomes is recognized,
which is the second requirement for drift, several regulators, commentators, and
industry participants have acknowledged the growing need to address the harms
resulting from retailization.2 72 In a study published in 2003, the SEC staff found
that:
Although these institutions typically qualify as "accredited investors" or "qualified
purchasers," these institutions, by investing in hedge funds, expose their partici-
pants or other beneficiaries to hedge funds. Thus, for example, a pension plan
that experiences substantial losses as a result of hedge fund fraud may be unable
to meet its obligations to pensioners.27 3
The staff further concluded that the exemptions that enable retailization make it
difficult for the SEC to anticipate and/or protect retail investors from inadvertent
exposure to hedge fund losses.2 74 Orice M. Williams, a GAO representative, sim-
ilarly found that many Fiduciary Investors lack the expertise to appropriately
understand hedge funds' complex valuation mechanisms, strategies, and fees,
271. Levy, supra note 171.
272. See, e.g., The Recent Developments in Hedge Funds: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing
& Urb. Affairs, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-39 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n); Alexander R. Roche, Comment, The Regulator Strikes Back: A Look at the
SEC's Most Recent Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds and What It Missed, 33 U. DAYTON L. REv. 145, 153-
54 (2007) (acknowledging the SEC's concerns regarding indirect retail investor exposure to hedge
funds and other alternative investments).
273. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 61, at 82.
274. Id. at 82-83 ("The collective indirect investment of the assets of less sophisticated individuals
into vehicles that are managed by entities that are not examined by the Commission leaves open the
possibility that the Commission will be unable to anticipate problems involving hedge funds that may
invest on behalf of these institutions.').
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exposing its retail investor beneficiaries to undue harm.2 75 Professor Jennifer
Taub from Vermont Law School has even advocated that hedge funds be brought
into the purview of the 1940 Act, at least in part to provide investors with
protections that extend beyond material disclosures, such as capital constraints
and restrictions on conflict of interest transactions.2 76
However, many scholars have dismissed the harms created by retailization be-
cause such an acknowledgement would perhaps place them in the precarious
position of dismantling historic notions of investor protection. Such principles
presume that institutional investors should have the resources to protect them-
selves (understandably so), and that regulators should not devote limited re-
sources to protecting such wealthy individuals and prestigious institutions. In
a similar vein, other scholars have dismissed the magnitude of retailization, pre-
dicting that a minimal number of Fiduciary Inventors have exposure to such al-
ternative investments.
A profusion of scholarly research as thus separated the harms resulting from
retailization and systemic risk. Such scholars have primarily focused on how the
law should be updated to regulate the growing threat of systemic risk, and many
such solutions have sought to navigate how the fractured nature of our regula-
tory system could effectively regulate the blurred distinctions between hedge
funds and banks.2 77 For instance, Professors John C. Coffee and Hillary Sale re-
jected the notion that the SEC should extend its existing authority to protect the
general public against systemically harmful hedge funds, given the SEC's limited
expertise in this area. They instead proposed that "the Federal Reserve [be
granted] authority to monitor and restrict the leverage of all financial institutions
that are 'too big to fail"' 2 78 in part because "banking regulators have the natural
comparative advantage in this area."279 Other scholars have emphasized the need
for consolidation of regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and CFTC, because
systemic risk can be transmitted through a variety of channels and financial
275. See Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins.,
& Gov. Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong., 1st Sess. 136-53 (2009) (state-
ment of Once M. Williams, Dir., Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv.).
276. Jennifer Taub, Recommendations for Reality-Based Regulatory Reform of Hedge Funds and
Other Private Pools of Capital 2, 3 (Oct. 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1543862.
277. Martin Shelby, supra note 59, at 666-67 ("With respect to the federal securities laws, the SEC
holds primary responsibility for regulating the securities industry and protecting investors, while the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ('CFTC') regulates commodity futures markets and the
bulk of OTC derivatives.... These agencies further delegate certain regulatory functions to self-
regulatory organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA') and the
National Futures Association ('NFA'), which create additional registration requirements for industry
participants. With respect to the banking industry, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve are the admin-
istrative bodies charged with monitoring the banking system and monetary policies. The Federal Re-
serve must frequently work with the Department of the Treasury in ensuring the nation's financial
stability." (footnotes omitted)).
278. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 776 (2009).
279. Id. at 777.
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instruments.2 8 0 Researchers have also proposed creating yet an additional ad-
ministrative entity that would act as an omnipresent regulator of all systemically
harmful financial institutions.2 8 1
In skipping to the fourth requirement for drift, which examines whether ef-
forts to update these rules have failed, the Dodd-Frank Act was similarly focused
on regulating large and interconnected financial institutions to prevent the cre-
ation and transmission of systemic risk, with a minimal focus on resolving retai-
lization. Although banks were identified as being the primary culprit of the fi-
nancial crisis that precipitated this legislation, hedge funds were swept in due
to their abilities to take on unlimited leverage and to trade in risky financial in-
struments. Systemic risk prevention took center stage as systemically harmful
hedge funds can be subject to prudential "bank-like" regulation by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"). 2 8 2 However, FSOC has yet to identify a
hedge fund as being systemically harmful and with the influence of the current
Trump administration, it is unclear whether FSOC will maintain its existing
power to regulate systemically harmful financial institutions.
Other components of the Dodd-Frank Act increased hedge fund disclosures to
a degree because many hedge fund advisers must now register under the Advis-
ers Act. 2 83 This could partially mitigate the harms resulting from retailization
due to the increased transparency guarantees provided under this law. Regis-
tered advisers must provide disclosures to their clients regarding their underly-
ing advisory business.2 84 These disclosures include material information relating
to their business practices, fees, disciplinary history, certain conflicts of interest,
and other material information.2 85 In addition, they have heightened fiduciary
duties to act in the best interests of their clients when dispensing investment ad-
vice.28 6 Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act does not require standardization with respect
to valuations, fees, or risk, which would provide meaningful protections to
hedge fund investors who are perhaps incapable of optimizing hedge fund in-
vestments. The Advisers Act is likewise limited in its ability to require specific
transparency mandates related to the underlying strategies and holdings of
such private investment vehicles.
280. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market Regulator,
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 533-34 (2009).
281. See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Putting the "Financial Stability" in Financial Stability Oversight Council,
76 OHIO ST. LJ. 1087, 1113-19 (2015); Alan Beattie & Sarah O'Connor, Bernanke Calls for Powerful
Regulator, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/6d4f943a-Od6e-1lde-8914-
0000779fd2ac.
282. 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018); Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP'T TREAS., http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
283. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403,
124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) to limit or eliminate certain
exemptions).
284. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018).
285. Id.; see also Fast Answers: Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 11, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersformadvhtm.html.
286. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018); see also SEC Fiduciary Standard, INV. ADVISER Ass'N, https://
www.investmentadviser.org/home/side-content/sec-standard (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
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There are a range of alternative rules that would swiftly reduce the harms re-
sulting from retailization, implicating the final requirement for drift. One such
solution would entail simply prohibiting Fiduciary Investors from investing in
hedge funds and other alternative asset vehicles. This is an unlikely scenario,
however, given the severe costs to hedge funds of completely eliminating such
a large class of its investors from the industry. Including a degree of alternative
asset exposure in Fiduciary Investor portfolios could also be beneficial to retail
investors who are seeking additional protections in declining markets. While
the research is divided as to whether hedge fund advisers can successfully do
this, additional disclosure obligations for such alternative investments could per-
haps assist Fiduciary Investors in selecting optimal investments during these
time periods. On the other end of the spectrum, the law could be updated to
subject hedge funds to enhanced regulation under the 1940 Act if they are avail-
able for investment by Fiduciary Investors. Each of these solutions, however,
would further entail a direct onslaught of investor protection principles by coun-
tering the strongly held notion that such institutional investors can appropriately
fend for themselves. Moreover, such a proposal will not likely succeed during
the current administration given its free-market ideology.
New evidence on the severity of the hedge fund conundrum may sway schol-
ars and lawmakers to fully digest the risks of retailization in the event that the
administration converts to being pro-regulation in the near future. Even still,
hedge fund advisers are powerful repeat players in advocating for beneficial reg-
ulatory outcomes. In 2015, for example, hedge funds spent $7.34 million in lob-
bying activities.2 8 7 Moreover, "[h] edge funds delivered $52 million to candidates
during the 2014 midterms" and "are wildly distorting democratic governmental
processes for their own benefit."288 An additional source provides that:
Whereas in 1990 hedge fund managers contributed just $125,000, this sum increased
to $1.6 million in 1996, to over $4 million in 2002 and then to over $19 million in
2008. In the 2012 election cycle hedge funds contributed over $32 million-24 per-
cent to Democrats and 76 percent to Republicans. Private equity and investment firms
contributed over $54 million . . . . These are still comparably small shares of total
party contributions, but they are rising fast.289
Part IV below will discuss a well-tailored solution that concedes the unlikelihood
of subjecting hedge funds to direct regulation, while relying on conversion in the
development of an institutional framework that could successfully resolve the
hedge fund conundrum.
287. David Dayen, What Good Are Hedge Funds?, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 25, 2016), http://prospect.
org/article/what-good-are-hedge-funds.
288. Id. (quoting, in the second instance, Michael Kink of Strong Economy for All).
289. Fichtner, supra note 180, at 17 (citing Hedge Funds: Long-Term Contribution Trends, CTR. FOR RE-
SPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2012&ind=F2700 (last visited
Mar. 20, 2019)).
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IV. CONVERSION AS A WELL-TAILORED SOLUTION
Although developing a detailed solution is largely outside the scope of this
article, Part IV explores the extent to which actors can rely on conversion to
develop unique and well-tailored solutions to the hedge fund conundrum dis-
cussed herein. Part IV.A summarizes preliminary thoughts on Prong 1 which
entails loosening section 18 capital restrictions under the 1940 Act to increase
investor protection for Fiduciary Investors interested in allocating to innovative
"hedge-fund-like" strategies. If Fiduciary Investors continue to allocate to hedge
funds in an inefficient manner however, then, as addressed in Part IV.B., Con-
gress should consider implementing Prong 2, which involves taking more drastic
measures to further protect underlying retail investor beneficiaries from exces-
sive fees and subpar returns. Part IV.C attempts to address potential drawbacks
to this proposal, which include a possible increase in speculative trading activ-
ities that may result from loosening these restrictions. Additional benefits could
counter these drawbacks, such as lower hedge fund fees and/or weeding out
low-performing hedge funds resulting from an increase in competition for trad-
ing innovative strategies in regulated markets.
A. PRONG 1: CONVERTING SECTION 18 CAPITAL RESTRICTIONS UNDER
THE 1940 ACT
The historical institutionalist analysis provided above infers that conversion
and drift are inevitable aspects of the development of the law, akin to the busi-
ness cycle which naturally moves through the economy irrespective of govern-
ment or private interventions. Institutional design strategies exist that could
admittedly reduce the likelihood of conversion, such as creating more unambig-
uous laws and increasing oversight over administrative agencies.290 However,
more clearly defined provisions that specifically outline covered activities are
more likely to lead to drift, i.e., laws failing to adapt to shifting realities, as
they would be more difficult to amend and less responsive to changed circum-
stances.291 On the other hand, preventing drift would entail building in a degree
of automation to existing rules so that future administrations are forced to up-
date underlying provisions periodically.292 But providing lawmakers with this
inherent flexibility to amend laws could expose such laws to conversion, i.e., po-
litical actors redirecting laws to meet divergent goals, as they may utilize this
power to convert its original purposes.293
Given the ubiquity of drift and conversion, Professor Hacker suggests that "ac-
tors who wish to change popular and embedded institutions in political environ-
ments that militate against authoritative reform may find it prudent not to attack
290. Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 19, at 189.
291. See id. (contending that specific and detailed laws, while less susceptible to conversion, are
"potentially more vulnerable to drift ... because what is not in the rule is also not covered by the
rule").
292. Id. at 190-91.
293. Id.
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such institutions directly."2 9 4 He further advises that, "[i]nstead, they may seek
to shift those institutions' ground-level operation, prevent their adaptation to
shifting external circumstances, or build new institutions on top of them."29 5
Thus, actors who wish to resolve the hedge fund conundrum should refrain
from proposing drastic regulatory solutions that serve to directly attack investor
protection. Instead, such actors should perhaps utilize conversion or drift to re-
direct existing legislation under various aspects of the federal securities laws to
new purposes.
One such example would entail relying on conversion to redirect provisions
under the 1940 Act to create additional leeway for mutual funds to compete
with hedge funds in pursuing more innovative strategies. In particular, section
18 imposes a series of capital restrictions that hinder mutual fund advisers
from pursuing innovative strategies involving short-trading and illiquid instru-
ments.2 9 6 For instance, under the section 18 restrictions on indebtedness, mu-
tual funds must sufficiently "cover" any derivative positions by earmarking or
segregating liquid securities equal in value to the fund's potential exposure
from the leveraged transaction.2 9 7 Reserving such a large portion of cash reserves
to cover any and all potential losses is simply not a viable investment scheme for
most vehicles. As such, mutual fund advisers limit the extent to which their ve-
hicles rely on derivatives to pursue innovative strategies or to hedge against risk.
Loosening these restrictions to a degree would create additional opportunities for
Fiduciary Investors to earn returns in declining markets and to diversify within
more regulated spaces.
While such a conversionist tactic appears to align with free-market ideologies
by eroding investor protections for mutual fund investors, it inadvertently cre-
ates a regulated hedge fund market (at least in part) without pressuring Congress
to directly impose such regulation on these private entities. And because mutual
funds are subject to the detailed registration requirements under the 1940 Act,
retail investors would still be given appropriate investor protections through
mandated disclosures and other heightened governance requirements.2 98 Fidu-
ciary Investors would therefore be free to invest in alternative investments that
294. Hacker, supra note 21, at 244.
295. Id.
296. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2018).
297. See id.; Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, 44 Fed. Reg.
25128, 25132 (Apr. 27, 1979) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271).
298. Other scholars have proposed comparable solutions which similarly advocate that retail in-
vestors gain indirect access to innovative strategies. See, e.g., Gubler, supra note 29, at 804-05 ("Thus,
the only reasonable second-order solution to the crowding-out problem is one that attempts to give
retail investors access to this market while addressing the information and liquidity issues presented
by the private securities market. To this end, we might want to think about increasing retail investors'
indirect access to the private securities markets, as opposed to direct access. Most Americans' stock
ownership is indirect anyway . . . . Moreover, investing in private securities through mutual funds
would allow the retail investor to have a more diversified portfolio of these securities, thereby reducing
the risks that would result from opening up direct access to the private securities markets."); Houman
B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POLy 251, 309-10 (2008) (proposing the creation of "a retail (Fund of Hedge Funds
('FOHF')] that raises capital through a private placement to an underwriter (or syndicate of underwrit-
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are fully transparent and standardized, making it easier to identify such optimal
investment strategies, while weeding out those that are subpar.2 9 9 This assumes
that some innovations currently utilized by hedge funds are helpful in producing
returns in bear markets that are collectively declining in value. Such a protec-
tionist strategy should presumably be available to retail investors in light of
the bear market that we will inevitably encounter in the future. Loosening
(but not eliminating) section 18 restrictions would allow retail investor access
to these strategies while providing such investors with attendant investor protec-
tion guarantees.
The section 18 provisions are also relatively antiquated, so urging the revision
of these provisions seems to be a necessary endeavor, as opposed to a direct on-
slaught on investors protection. Such an approach would also make it easier for
underlying retail beneficiaries to hold Trustees accountable for conflicts of inter-
est and other potential fiduciary breaches that were previously shrouded in se-
crecy. It would improve the transparency of an essential subset of alternative in-
vestments that enable economically irrational allocations. In many ways, this
approach extends the theoretical framework of conversion by urging actors to uti-
lize seemingly opposing regulatory approaches to achieve their purported goals.
B. PRONG 2: EXCLUDING FIDUCIARY INVESTORS FROM
PRIVATE FUND ACCESS
If Fiduciary Investors continued allocating to hedge funds in an inefficient
manner, despite the increased access to protectionist strategies granted under
Prong 1 above, then Congress should consider taking more drastic measures
to further protect underlying retail investor beneficiaries from excessive fees
and subpar returns. Such drastic measures would directly exclude Fiduciary In-
vestors from accessing Private Funds altogether. Carving out Fiduciary Investors
from the definitions of "accredited investor" under Regulation D and "qualified
purchaser" under the 1940 Act would automatically serve this end. Congress
would have to initiate such amendments as the SEC would probably exceed
its regulatory authority in doing so.
Adopting such an extreme solution would be met with more stringent oppo-
sition from the hedge fund industry as institutional investors, such as pension
plans, endowments, and foundations, comprise the bulk of hedge fund alloca-
tors. Eliminating such a large portion of hedge fund investors would likely re-
ers) who, in turn, lists the securities of the retail FOHF on a trading platform accessible only by so-
phisticated investors").
299. The successful implementation of Prong 1 would likely require the retooling of certain tax
laws that serve to incentivize allocations to hedge funds. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Mutual
Funds, Fairness, and the Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REv. 139, 184 (2013) ("Forced realization income ex-
ists as a result of the combination of mutual funds' obligation to redeem shareholders on demand and
the requirement that they distribute substantially all of their capital gains. These two requirements,
separately, cause mutual funds to approximate direct investments, but as a result of their interaction,
mutual fund investors face additional tax costs that rich investors can avoid.").
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quire an exogenous shock, such as a financial crisis or massive fraud, in order to
justify the accompanying costs. A regulatory solution of this nature would also
directly challenge the long-held belief, which is an intrinsic component of the
investor protection paradigm, that Fiduciary Investors are fully capable of fend-
ing for themselves and thereby protecting underlying retail investor beneficiaries.
Imposing such a radical regulatory solution would necessarily require a change
in the political ideology of our current administration, which is rooted in free-
market principles. Nevertheless, Prong 2 should be considered by Congress if
recalibrating section 18 capital restrictions fails to deter Fiduciary Investors
from allocating to low-performing hedge funds with excessive fee levels.
C. POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
Loosening the section 18 restrictions provided in Prong 1 above could unde-
niably result in unintended consequences related to compromising market integ-
rity and exposing investors to undue risk. Permitting mutual funds to trade more
derivatives for instance could increase collective levels of speculative trading ac-
tivities in the broader capital markets. John Bogle, a prominent expert in the mu-
tual fund industry, has explored the risks of increasing speculation in the
broader economy in prior works.300 Exclusively profiting from the short-term
prices movements in instruments, as opposed to making long-term investments
in companies, could arguably compromise economic growth. Moreover, actively
traded mutual fund advisers have been subject to extensive critiques in terms of
their abilities to earn above-market returns, as well as the extent to which such
advisers charge similarly excessive fees.
Excessive speculation could however be resolved by implementing the regula-
tory solution set forth under Prong 2 above. Congress should thus explore im-
plementing this solution as a means to bolster market integrity in addition to en-
hancing investor protection. Excluding Fiduciary Investor access to Private
Funds would likely decrease overall speculation because hedge funds can freely
utilize derivatives and leverage to engage in speculative trading strategies. Clos-
ing the systemic risk loopholes within the hedge fund industry that have been
left unresolved under the Dodd-Frank Act is yet an additional solution that
should be explored by Congress in response to excessive speculation.301 Scaled
regulation under the 1940 Act for hedge funds could serve as a unique and ef-
fective mechanism in protecting against systemic risk. For instance, hedge funds
that exceed a certain size could be subject to a range of disclosure requirements
and/or capital constraints provided under section 18 of the 1940 Act.
The extensive investor protection guarantees provided under the 1940 Act
and other federal securities laws naturally provide greater protections against ex-
cessive risk-taking on the part of mutual fund advisers. They, along with their
300. See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, THE CLASH OF CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS. SPECULATION passim (2012) (ex-
pressing concerns regarding excessive speculation which can divert capital from its optimal use).
301. See Martin Shelby, supra note 59, at 682, 684-87, 698-700 (proposing an SEC mandated
regulatory framework for systemically harmful hedge funds).
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underlying funds, would still be subject to extensive disclosure requirements,
standardized valuation procedures, and enhanced governance requirements to
protect against conflicts of interest. Many of the harms associated with excessive
trading of derivatives were related to the opacity in which these markets were
permitted to function, which served to obscure valuations and risk.3 0 2 Mutual
fund fees are also collectively lower than hedge fund fees because most are
not permitted to charge separate performance fees. Such advisers have fewer op-
portunities for charging hidden fees given their extensive disclosure obligations
which also obligate standardized reporting mechanisms. Measuring the extent to
which actively traded mutual fund advisers can earn above-market returns in a
variety of market conditions should be an ongoing task on the part of regulators
and researchers. Increasing transparency with respect to the subset of innovative
strategies permitted under this approach would greatly assist researchers in this
regard.
Any such loosening of section 18 provisions should be further accompanied
by a degree of automation where a team of experts within the SEC is obligated
to review and update such provisions periodically, perhaps every four years. The
SEC's Division of Economic and Risk Analysis should undertake this task as this
relatively new "think tank" division "relies on a variety of academic disciplines,
quantitative and non-quantitative approaches, and knowledge of market institu-
tions and practices to help the Commission approach complex matters in a fresh
light."3 0 3 Incorporating a team of experts in this regard would reduce drift and
would ensure that the best and brightest are charged with protecting against
speculation in reviewing the section 18 restrictions.
Generally speaking, increasing competition with respect to innovative strate-
gies could effectually lower the fees charged by hedge fund advisers and similarly
reduce the wealth gap created by these unfettered opportunities to charge exces-
sive feeS.304 Increasing the number of entrants to these niche markets would ef-
fectually lower fees because a larger number of advisers would be competing for
the same pools of investors. Creating a pathway for more regulated funds to
compete in this space would likewise make it easier for investors to pay advisory
302. See, e.g., Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is Inevitable, FOR-
BES (Jan. 8, 2013, 6:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/08/five-years-after-
the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks/#7ee9bf9a3a41; Sarah H. Wright, Explaining
the Credit Crunch, NATL BUREAU ECON. RE5., http://www.nber.org/digest/mar09/wl4612.htm (last visited
Mar. 19, 2019).
303. About the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https:II
www.sec.gov/dera/about (last modified Jan. 18, 2017).
304. Jonathan Rothwell, Make Elites Compete: Why the 1% Earn So Much and What to Do About It,
BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/make-elites-compete-why-the-
1-earn-so-much-and-what-to-do-about-it/ ("The law has also inflated the compensation of hedge
fund workers-roughly $500,000 on average-by restricting competition. Mutual funds-which
charge tiny fees by comparison-are currently barred from using hedge fund strategies because
they have non-rich investors. If the law was changed to allow mutual funds to offer hedge fund port-
folios, hundreds of billions of dollars would be transferred annually from super-rich hedge fund
managers and investment bankers to ordinary investors, and even low-income workers with retire-
ment plans.").
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fees that more closely match the skillsets offered by such advisers. Economic the-
ory similarly posits that increasing competition has the effect of reducing wealth
inequality. A study published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development found that:
Market power may contribute substantially to wealth inequality, augmenting wealth
of the richest 10% of the population by 12% to 21% for an average country in the
sample. . . . Sources of market power vary, and many are generally considered legit-
imate such as intellectual property protection for products, processes or brands. But
violations of competition law, government-created barriers to entry or natural mo-
nopolies may be significant sources of market power.305
This study further reiterated the need for policymakers to reshift focus toward
laws that increase competition as a means to reduce income inequality, as op-
posed to the standard "wealth redistribution" policies that are repeatedly pro-
posed and debated by scholars/commentators in this area.3 0 6
CONCLUSION
This article dissects the severity of the hedge fund conundrum which has un-
duly exposed retail investors to excessive losses. Fiduciary Investors, such as
pension plans, endowments, and charitable foundations, have extensively allo-
cated to hedge funds despite increasing reports of poor returns. Even if hedge
funds can earn superior returns in declining markets, Fiduciary Investors do
not seem to possess the tools for effectively navigating the opacity of the indus-
try. Historical institutionalism provides a novel framework for revealing the ex-
tent to which lawmakers may have enabled a conundrum of this nature across
extended periods of time. By and large, lawmakers converted original notions
of publicness under federal securities laws by expanding indirect retail investor
access to private investments. Lawmakers then failed to update these amended
definitions of publicness despite growing evidence of the harms resulting from
retailization. Examining how institutions have evolved throughout history pro-
vides hints as to what solutions would be successful in the current political
and economic climate. Subjecting hedge funds to direct regulation would likely
be unsuccessful given the industry's repeated success in advocating for favorable
regulatory outcomes. Instead, regulators could create a regulated market for
"hedge-fund-like" strategies by loosening the section 18 capital restrictions
that currently apply to mutual funds. Such a strategy would ensure that Fidu-
ciary Investors can successfully access opportunities for wealth maximization
during declining markets, while providing retail investors with the investor pro-
tection guarantees that they are entitled to under the federal securities laws. If the
hedge fund conundrum persists, then Congress should consider implementing
the more extreme measure of excluding such Fiduciary Investors from accessing
305. SEAN ENNIS, PEDRO GONZAGA & CHRIS PIKE, INEQUALITY: A HIDDEN COST OF MARKET POWER 23
(2017), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Inequality-hidden-cost-market-power-2017.pdf.
306. Id. at 23-24.
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private fund investments. These preliminary proposals hould, however, be sub-
ject to additional scrutiny given the harms that could result from increasing ac-
cess to speculative investments. In a similar vein, researchers should dedicate
more attention to the evolving definitions of publicness in this area of the law
given the growing prominence of investment funds in managing retirement
assets for households across the country.
